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THE EFFICIENT NORM FOR CORPORATE
LAW: A NEOTRADITIONAL
INTERPRETATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Thomas A. Smith*
To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing
between directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the
corporation1 itself smacks of reification2 - treating the fictional cor
porate entity as if it were a real thing. Now the orthodox view among
corporate law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary duty is a norm
that requires firm managers to "maximize shareholder value."3 Giving
the corporation itself any serious role in the analysis of fiduciary duty,
the thinking goes, obscures scientific insight with bad legal metaphys

ics.

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. A.B. 1979, Cornell; B.
A.
1981, University of Oxford; J.D. 1984, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank Larry Alexander,
Stuart Benjamin, Lynne Dallas, Hugh Friedman, Robert W. Hillman, Paul Horton, Mike
Kelly, Frank Partnoy, Mike Rappaport, Dan Rodriguez, Emily Sherwin, Chris Wonnell, and
Fred Zacharias for helpful comments, some of which were made at the University of San
Diego Law School Research Colloquium. Particular thanks to Suzanne Skolnick, my re
search assistant, for her excellent work. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Carol
Marie Gromer.

1. "[A] distinction, " Lawrence Mitchell notes, "that has been slighted in the law."
Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 586 {1992); see also Donald E. Schwartz,
Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALi's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 511, 512 {1984).
2. The Oxford English Dictionary defines reification as "the mental conversion of a per
son or abstract concept into a thing." 13 THE COMPACT EDITION OF TIIE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 532 {2d ed.1989).
3. See, e.g., ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY {1932); MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FuNDAMENTALS
OF CORPORATION LAW 97 {1995) {Corporate law scholars "generally agree[ ] that
management's principal fiduciary duty is to maximize the return to the common
shareholders . ... "); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Nonn: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1423 (1993); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049 (1931); Kenneth B.Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the

Expense ofShareholder Gain - A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law,
13 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 7, 8 {1988) ("[M]aximization of shareholder value is the polestar of
managerial decisionmaking. "); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?:
The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL.J. CORP. L. 33 (1991). For a

good summ ary of the shareholder primacy norm in legal scholarship, see D. Gordon Smith,
The Shareholder Primacy Nonn, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277-83 {1998).
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Some recent scholarship4 and legislation, such as constituency stat
utes,5 have challenged this "shareholder primacy"6 view. Contestants
on both sides of the debate over corporate fiduciary duty assume,
however, that economic analysis inevitably favors shareholder pri
macy.7 Critics of shareholder value maximization encourage this as
sumption by making their case turn, in part, on criticisms of economic
methodology itself8 and on invocations of moral and political values

4. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence G. Mitchell ed., 1995);
Margaret M. Blair, Stakeholders as Shareholders, Ownership and Control: Rethinking
Corporate GovernarJce for the Twenty-First Century, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1150 (1996);
William W. Bratton, Jr., Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, 44 RUTGERS L. REV.
675 (1992); Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy ofShareholder Primacy: A Proposed
Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 587 (1997); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993); David Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law, 24 lND. L. REV. 223 (1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law]; Lawrence
E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 V AND. L. REV. 1263 (1992)
[hereinafter Mitchell, A Critical Look]; Mitchell, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0830(3) (1997); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (1994);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (1993 Replacement); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (West 1981); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, 65 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. 302A.251 (West 1985); MISS.
CODE ANN. 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:6-1(2) (West 1969); N.M. STAT.
ANN. 53-ll-35(D) (Michie Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1701.59(E) (Baldwin 1995);
WIS. STAT. ANN. 180.0827 (West 1995). Some apply only when an acquisition proposal is
under review. See Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702(1996); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602, -1702
(1995); IOWA CODE ANN. 491.lOlB (West 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92 G (West
1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1994). Some place other constituencies in putative equal
ity with shareholders. See IND. CODE ANN. 23-1-35-l(f) (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 491.lOlB (West 1991); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 515 (1995).
For scholarly reaction to constituency statutes, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971 (1992); William J. Camey, Does
Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990); Eric W. Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14
(1992); Patrick J. Ryan, Calculating the "Stakes" for Corporate Stakeholders as Part ofBusi
ness Decision-Making, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 555 (1992); Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper
Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919); Lyman Johnson, The
Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEXAS L.
REV. 865 (1990); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313 (1992); Smith, supra
note 3, at 277. For other statements of duty to shareholders in case law, see Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Polk v. Good, 507
A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J.
1981).
7. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 68; Jonathan R. Macey, An Eco
nomic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiar
ies of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 26-29 (1991). For an unsympa
thetic account of the link between shareholder primacy and economic analysis, see Johnson,
supra note 6, at 884-86. Both proponents and critics, however, believe that shareholder pri
macy is grounded in an economic view.
8.�Lyman Johnson, for example, inveighs as follows:
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most economists would find controversial at best.9
Nevertheless, the economic approach to corporate law does not
foreordain the maximization of shareholder value as the primary norm
of corporate law. The economic case for shareholder value maximiza
tion is, in fact, initially puzzling and ultimately unconvincing. If eco
nomic efficiency is the normative guidepost for substantive law, the
principal norm of corporate law cannot be the maximization of share
holder value.
It is easy to see why this must be so. The corporate fiduciary duty,
according to the leading economic analysis of corporate law, is a prin
ciple that fills gaps in the "corporate contract."10 The "corporate con
tract" is the metaphorical contract consisting of the sum of the volun
tary arrangements among the various parties who contribute resources
to the corporate enterprise and have claims against it.11 Discovering

(W]hile the notions of accountability and efficiency serve as [the economic] model's appar
ent lifelines to more widely shared social norms, the dreary egoistic underpinnings make it
clear that those notions are only enticing window dressing; they are not essential. The con
tractual model subscribes to the root norm that, in a pinch, people do - therefore they
should - act to save their own skin. If that is one's sense of life, why should the ethos in
work and business or corporate law be different? • . . [It] reminds one of B.F. Skinner's work
with pigeons.
Johnson, supra note 6, at 895-96 (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW 35, 39-49 (Lawrence G. Mitchell, ed., 1995); David Millon, Comm unitari
anism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW 1, 4-10 (Lawrence G. Mitchell, ed., 1995); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Com

munity and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997); Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the
Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997); Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sov
ereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM.L.REV. 2215 (1992); Johnson, supra note 6;
David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment
at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1998); Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law, supra note 4; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990);
Marleen A. O'Connor, Symposium, Corporate Malaise - Stakeholder Statllles: Cause or
Cure?, 21 STETSON L.REV. 3 (1991); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1189 (1991) (hereinafter O'Connor, Restructuring]; Orts, supra note 5; Lewis D. Solo
mon, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Constituency Debate, 59 U.
CIN. L.REV. 321 (1990).
10. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 90-93.
11. The contractual approach to the firm was developed by economists, see Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972); Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,
390-92 (1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial

Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 307-08 (1976);
William A. Klein, The Modem Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91
YALEL.J.1521, 1521 (1982); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J.1197,
1200 (1984); and applied by lawyers, see, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law - Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Contractual Freedom]; Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints 011
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1840-46 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk,
Limiting Contractual Freedom]; Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover
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the correct gap-filling principles for the corporate contract involves
hypothetical bargain analysis - asking what contractual terms ra
tional parties would have agreed to had they addressed ex ante the
matter that falls into a contractual gap.12 For corporate contracts, the
prevailing view is that this gap-filling principle should be "maximize
shareholder value." According to this view, that is the substance of
the corporate fiduciary duty.
One can adopt the contractual approach to corporate law and
agree that the fiduciary duty is essentially a principle for filling gaps in
corporate contracts. Nevertheless, the next step in the argument for
the prevailing view, that the substance of this gap-filling principle
should be shareholder value maximization, does not follow. Rational
corporate investors in a hypothetical bargain setting would not agree
to shareholder value maximization as their gap-filling rule. The main
point of this Article is to explain why they would not and to explain
what they would choose instead.
Rational corporate investors would not choose shareholder wealth
maximization as their gap-filling rule because of what investor ration
ality entails. In economic analysis of corporate law, it is standard to
treat shareholders as rational in the sense described in basic finance
theory, in particular, the Capital Assets Pricing Model ("CAPM").
Investors who are rational in the CAPM sense would hypothetically
agree to a gap-filling principle, but it would not be "maximize share
holder value." Under CAPM, rational investors will diversify among
all classes of capital assets, including both corporate stocks and bonds.
In fact, they will hold the "market portfolio," that is, a portfolio that is
a microcosm of all capital assets, in which each type of capital asset
has the same place proportionally in the rational investor's portfolio as
it does in the capital market as a whole. Thus it would be irrational
for investors to agree to a principle that required the value of their
shares to be maximized if it meant reducing the value of their bonds
(or of any other nonresiduary class of capital assets they might hold)
by more than the increase in the value of their stock. The shareholder
value maximization norm allows, and under plausible assumptions
even requires, managers to make inefficient decisions which hypo
thetical rational investors would not permit ex ante. Rational inves
tors would therefore not agree to it.
To what corporate law norm would rational investors hypotheti
cally agree? They would agree to a norm that told managers to maxiStatutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 615-17 (1988). For a critical view of
contractualism, see William \V. Bratton Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).

12. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 90-91; Daniel R.Fischel, The Cor
porate Governance Movement, 3 5 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982); Jonathan R.Macey, An
Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Benefi
ciaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991).
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mize the value of the diversified portfolios that CAPM says rational
investors would hold. As a gap-filling principle, this would require
firm managers to make the choices that would maximize the value of
the sum of financial claims against the corporation, because these
claims will be held proportionally by rational CAPM investors holding
the market portfolio.13 If a public corporation were financed half by
stock and half by bonds, a rational investor holding the market port
folio would have his investment in that corporation divided evenly be
tween its stock and its bonds. He would obviously not agree to a rule
that allowed managers to make choices that diminished the value of
his bonds by more than they increased the value of his stock. He
would insist on a rule that required managers to maximize the value of
the sum of the two classes of claims against that corporation. This rule
would be the gap filler which rational investors would agree managers
should follow if the corporate contract did not provide otherwise.
This would be the content of the fiduciary duty rational investors
would accept ex ante.
Articulating this duty has interesting consequences. A fiduciary
duty running to the corporation itself would be most consistent with
the gap-filling rule that emerges from hypothetical bargain analysis.
This rule would require corporate managers (absent explicit contrac
tual terms to the contrary) to take whatever actions maximized the
value of "the corporation" - maximized, that is, the sum of the value
of financial claims against the corporation - whether doing so pri
marily benefited shareholders or some other class of corporate claim
ants. Far from mysteriously reifying the corporation, this approach
This
requires nothing more conceptually murky than addition.
reformulation of the duty is notably inconsistent, however, with treat
ing one class of corporate claimants, such as common shareholders, as
the exclusive and direct beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty, as is now
standard in economic analysis of corporate law. It is also inconsistent,
however, with making all or several classes of claimants against the
corporation direct and simultaneous beneficiaries of the fiduciary
duty, as seems to be suggested by some advocates of bondholder
rights.14 The "neotraditional" conception of fiduciary duty I propose,
a duty running to the corporation itself, would require actions of man-

13. A financial claim is a legal claim against a financial asset - a claim that might arise,
for example, from ownership. A financial asset is an asset such as a stock, bond, right, cer
tificate, etc., as distinguished from a tangible, physical asset. For example, real property is a
physical asset, but shares in a real estate investment trust (REIT) or stock or bonds of a
company that held property as an investment would be financial assets. See JOHN DOWNES
& JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 311 (4th ed. 1995).
Many assets, such as tort claims, are not normally considered financial assets but can be con
verted into financial assets through a process of "securitization. " See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith,
A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367, 419-32 (1994).
14. For authors suggesting a fiduciary duty to bondholders, see supra note 4.
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agers that would sometimes benefit one class of claimants and some
times another, depending on the circumstances. Once one dispenses
with misguided fears of reification, there is nothing particularly trou
bling about this approach.
There is, however, more than a mere theoretical quibble in the dif
ference between a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders of public
corporations to maximize the value of their shares and a duty owed to
the corporation to maximize its value. It is true that managers of a
"plain vanilla" public corporation, one with a simple capital structure
and little debt, might have incentives to maximize the sum of the value
of all financial claims against that corporation. When corporate capi
tal structures get more complicated in certain ways, however, the
shareholder value maximization version of fiduciary duty will mislead
managers. And there is every reason to expect corporate capital struc
tures will become increasingly complex in just those ways, as Professor
Hu, one of the leading prophets of financial complexity, has convinc
ingly argued.15 For example, the "equity" of firms can be (and is be
ing) sliced up into various derivative securities.16 Stock can be struc
tured as claims on the profits of certain parts of the issuer's business
rather than on the whole business of the corporation.17 Firms can be
come highly leveraged18 and can issue hybrid securities.19 These inno
vations strain traditional concepts of fiduciary duty. This problem is
not as difficult to resolve, however, as Professor Hu seems to think.
The neotraditional conception of fiduciary duty I propose responds,

15. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern Process ofFinancial Inno
vation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1273 (1991).
16. See id. at 1277; see also Bernard J. Karol & Mary B. Lehman, Equity Derivatives, 27
REV. OF SEC. & COMM. REG. 121 (1994); Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products:
Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1319 (1991);
Thomas A. Russo, Regulation ofEquity Derivatives, 815 PU/CORP 335 (1993); Saul Hansell,
ls the World Ready for Synthetic Equity?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1990, at 54;
Claire Makin, Hedging Your Derivatives Doubts, INSTITUTIONAL lNvEsTOR, Dec. 1991, at
113.
17. See THE HANDBOOK OF EQUTIY DERIVATIVES 3-32 (Jack Clark Francis et al. eds,
1995); Jeffrey Allen, Reinventing a Corporation: The "Satellite" Structure of Thermo Elec
tron, 11 J. APP. CORP. FIN., Summer 1998, at 38; Jeffrey Allen & John McConnell, Equity
Carve-outs and Managerial Discretion, 53 J. FIN. 163 (1998); Hu, supra note 15, at 1288-1300;
Bernard J. Karol, An Overview ofDerivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus.
& FIN. 195, 203 (1995); Dennis E. Logue et al., Rearranging Residual Claims: A Case for
Targeted Stock, 25 J. FIN. MGMT. 43 (1996); Roni Michaely & Wayne H. Shaw, The Choice
of Going Public: Spin-offs vs. Carve-outs, 24 J. FIN. MGMT. 5 (1995); Vikram Nanda, On the
Good News in Equity Carve-outs, 46 J. FIN. 1717 (1991).
18. See Allen, supra note 17.
19. See JOHN F. MARSHALL & VIPUL K. BANSAL, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INNOVATION 475-492 (1992); Issuers Opt For Hybrid Se
curities, 2 INS. FIN. & INv. No. 26 (1997); Karol, supra note 17, at 203; Kerry Capell, High
Yields, Low Cost, Funny Names, Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1996, at 122; R.S. Salomon, Jr., Profitable
Hybrid, FORBES, Apr. 24, 1995, at 404.
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for all its simplicity, remarkably well to these challenges, as I explain
below.
This Article begins by describing in Part I the familiar conflict be
tween the interests of shareholders and those of bondholders. I add a
new point by stressing, however, that this problem is not limited, as is
often supposed, to the "vicinity of insolvency,"20 to use Chancellor
Allen's phrase.21 It will, under standard and plausible assumptions of
modern finance theory, never be efficient for firm managers to
"maximize shareholder value," as long as there are fixed claims such
as bonds in the firm's capital structure. The "vicinity of insolvency,"
strictly speaking, is determined only by the riskiness of the invest
ments available to the firm. If financial markets are complete, as
modern finance theory usually assumes, available investments will not
be limited by their riskiness. The capital market will offer a complete
menu, including even extremely risky investments. Some of these
risky opportunities will increase the expected value of stock, the resid
ual claims on a firm, but decrease the value of nonresidual claims by
even more, thus decreasing the expected value of the sum of financial
claims again the firm. Thus the "vicinity of insolvency," as Chancellor
Allen has imagined it, cannot be defined, and therefore the moment at
which a firm enters it is indeterminate. In a simple world of firms with
stock and debt and complete capital markets, it will be inefficient for
managers to maximize shareholder value, because that would mean
managers should pick very risky and inefficient bets.
This problem motivates Part II of this Article, which attempts to
formulate an efficient version of the corporate fiduciary duty. Eco
nomic analysis of corporate law, as I noted above, views the corpora
tion as a nexus of contracts, and the corporate fiduciary duty as a
"gap-filling principle." Economic analysts typically determine gap
filling principles by using hypothetical bargain analysis - asking what
gap-filling principle rational parties would have agreed to ex ante. In
Part II, I use hypothetical bargain analysis to show that rational inves
tors would not choose shareholder value maximization as a norm, but
rather would choose maximization of corporate value as a norm. This
analysis, as I noted above, involves a conception of investor rationality
derived from CAPM.
In the remainder of the Article, I turn to some practical applica
tions. In Part III, I look briefly at some areas of public corporation
law that illustrate the indifference of corporate law to merely distribu
tional transactions, a phenomenon that is easiest to explain in light of
rational investor indifference to transactions of these kinds. In Part

20. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No.
Civ.A 12150, 1991 WL 2776 13, at * 34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
21. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1511- 12 & n.87 (1993).
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IV, I summarize the issues Hu has raised concerning the stresses fi
nancial innovation and the disaggregation of equity is putting on tradi
tional conceptions of fiduciary duty in corporate law. The norm of
maximizing corporate value - what I term the "neotraditional" ap
proach - is, I suggest, an intuitively appealing way to relieve this
stress. Part V is a brief conclusion.
I.

THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MAxlMIZATION NORM

Corporate law scholars generally assume that efficiency arguments
inevitably lead to the conclusion that maximizing shareholder value
should be the primary norm of corporate law.22 This conclusion, how
ever, is unwarranted. In fact, the shareholder value maximization
norm, if strictly applied, would require firm managers to make socially
inefficient choices. This analysis follows from the familiar corporate
law problem of the firm in the "vicinity of insolvency."23
A.

Shareholder Value Maximization Mandates Inefficiency

In this Part, I use a numerical example to show how a norm to
maximize shareholder value mandates inefficiency and then explore
some implications.

1.

An Inefficient Risky Investment

Consider the choice faced by the managers of XYZ corporation.
They must choose between only two investment opportunities. In
vestment 1 is relatively safe; Investment 2, risky. XYZ corporation is
solvent. It has assets worth $20 million and liabilities of $15 million,
all of which is owed to bondholders.
Investment 1 requires an outlay of $10 million and has a 90 percent
probability of being worth $12 million, and a 10 percent probability of
being worth $8 million, after one period. Thus Investment 1 has an
expected value of $11.6 million, and net of the initial outlay of $10
million, a value of $1.6 million. Put another way, shareholders have a
90 percent chance of a $2 million gain, and a 10 percent chance of a $2
million loss, for an expected gain to shareholders from Investment 1 of
$1.6 million.
All of the expected gain from Investment 1 would go to the share-

22. For discussions of maximizing share value as socially efficient, see EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 38; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Cor
porate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 203-05
(1991); Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1329; and Milton Friedman, The Social Respon
sibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
23. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 21.

222

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:214

holders because the claim of bondholders is fixed at $15 million.
Whether Investment 1 pays off at $12 million or $8 million, XYZ will
have enough value left in it to pay the bondholders all of the $15 mil
lion that is owed to them.
Investment 2, on the other hand, is much more risky. It also re
quires an outlay of $10 million, but it has a 10 percent probability of
paying off grandly at $200 million. But it has a 90 percent probability
of wiping the company out by generating losses of $20 million, equal
to all of the assets of the company. Investment 2 has an expected
value of only $2 million, and, net of the required initial outlay of $10
million, a value of negative $8 million. From the perspective of social
wealth, it is obviously a bad investment - it has a negative net ex
pected value.
Shareholders, however, will not view it as so bad. If Investment 2
pays off at $200 million, shareholders will get all of it. If the bet pays
off at negative $20 million, on the other hand, shareholders will not
lose the entire $20 million, because they enjoy limited liability. In
stead, they will lose their equity in XYZ, which is only $5 million.
Thus the expected value of Investment 2 to shareholders is 10 percent
of $200 million plus 90 percent of negative $5 million, for a total ex
pected gain to shareholders of $16.5 million. Net of the $10 million
initial outlay, Investment 2 has an expected value to shareholders of
$6.5 million.
Bondholders, of course, would bear the brunt of the risk of In
vestment 2. If Investment 2 pays off big, they will be no better off
than before; they will still be paid only their fixed claim of $15 million.
If Investment 2 fails, however, they will lose their investment, which
was worth $15 million before the risky bet was made.24 With the for
mer event having a 10 percent chance of happening, and the latter a 90
percent chance, bondholders face an expected loss of $13.5 million
from Investment 2.
Faced with the choice between Investment 1 and Investment 2,
corporate managers exclusively loyal to the shareholders should
choose Investment 2, even though it has a net expected value of less
than Investment 1. That is, managers loyal to shareholders will choose
Investment 2, even though it is inefficient. In terms of normative eco
nomic theory, this is an absurd result. There must be something
wrong with the simple formulation of corporate fiduciary duty as a
duty to "maximize shareholder value."

24. I am assuming that bond covenants do not prevent the risky, inefficient bet. If bond
covenants were complete, then no risky, inefficient bet would be unanticipated. They are
not, however. See infra text accompanying note 53.
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In the "Vicinity of Insolvency"

Corporate law scholars will recognize that the illustration above is

similar to those used to illustrate the "vicinity of insolvency," the re
gion in which managers are said to have incentives to make excessively
risky investments.25 Because of this problem, Delaware corporate law
recognizes an exception to the rule that managers owe their fiduciary
duty exclusively to shareholders. In the Credit Lyonnais case,26 Chan
cellor William Allen opined that "in the vicinity of insolvency," the fi
duciary duty "shifts" from being owed to shareholders to being owed
to creditors.

One could argue that the illustration above is merely an instance of
a firm operating in the vicinity of insolvency. It is already well known,
one could say, that in this vicinity, managers have incentives to make
inefficient choices, and corporate law recognizes an exception in this
region to the general rule that managers have a duty to maximize
share value. For this objection to have any force, however, there must
be some region which is outside the vicinity of insolvency: it must be
the case that, except in unusual settings, the norm of shareholder value
maximization does yield efficient choices.
In fact, however, this is not the case. Rather, firms are always in
the vicinity of insolvency because all it takes for any firm, no matter
how solvent, to become insolvent is to lose a sufficiently risky bet.27
One can construct for any firm, no matter how solvent (so long as it
has debt and limited liability), a bet sufficiently risky that it would in
crease the value of its shares, while it decreased the total value of the

company - a bet, that is, that would be socially inefficient for the firm
to make. For example, take very solvent firm ABC, which has assets

of $100 million and liabilities of $10 million. By making a highly lev
eraged bet in, say, the derivatives market, it would have, let us sup
pose, a one in one hundred chance of gaining $10 billion, and a 99 per
cent chance of losing the firm's entire value. This bet would have a
present value of $10.9 million to shareholders, while it would have an

25. See Rima F. Hartman, Note, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Di
rectors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761, 1766
(1993); Stephen R. McDonnell, Comment, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency
Shifts Directors' Burden From Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177, 209-10
(1994).

26. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No.
Civ.A.12150, 1991WL 277613, at 1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).

See generally Carol J.
Long-Term Capital Has
All But Crumbled. So Why Did Warren Buffett Offer to Buy It?, FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at
110; Anita Raghavan & Matt Murray, Financial Firms Lose $8 Billion So Far - Global
Fallout from Russia Hits Big Banks, Others; Meriwether Fund Hurt, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3,
1998, at A2; Leah Nathans Spiro, How Long-Term Rocked Stocks, Too, Bus. WK., Nov. 9,
27. Just ask the people at Long-Tenn Capital Management.
Loomis, A House Built On Sand: John Meriwether's Once Mighty

1998, at 160.
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expected value to the corporation of only $1 million. The price of this
lottery-ticket-like bet is, let us suppose, $10 million. Thus it has a net
expected value to the corporation of negative $9 million - obviously a
bad bet for the firm Yet managers maximizing shareholder value
would still choose this investment over any similarly priced bet that
had an expected value of less than $10.9 million for the shareholders,
even though other bets would be better for the corporation.
That, however, has to do with the firm being in the vicinity of in
solvency only in a trivial sense. It is just that the closer to insolvency a
firm is, the less risky a bet has to be for its loss to push the firm into
bankruptcy. If managers really are duty bound to maximize the value
of shares, then they are duty bound to make inefficient choices like the
one just illustrated as long as these choices are available, and they will
be. The conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders,
therefore, does not merely result in inefficient incentives when the
firm is in the vicinity of insolvency. It exists whenever there are ineffi
cient risky bets available that would increase share value but decrease
firm value. In theory, and increasingly in reality, this is all the time.
A possible reaction to my argument above would be to dismiss it as
invoking excessively unlikely events. This reaction, however, would
be inappropriate. It may seem that opportunities to bet the company
on a long shot are rare and therefore that my argument does not raise
a serious problem with the shareholder value maximization norm.
This and other practically minded objections to my argument are
likely based on misunderstandings of how a corporate law norm
should function, as I discuss below.
.

3.

Complete Capital Markets

It may seem that managers rarely make bets like those illustrated
above, unless their company is about to fail. If these occurrences are
very rare, the problems they create for fiduciary duty theory, one
might argue, are of academic interest only. This objection, however,
misses the point. These occurrences may be rare, but not because
managers lack opportunities to make long-shot bets. Indeed, modern
finance theory typically assumes (with increasing realism) the near
completeness of capital markets.28 In complete capital markets, it is
possible to bet on nearly any possible future world state, including low
probability ones. Managers can, in theory, bet the company on very
risky opportunities, and there is no reason to suppose that these op
portunities are rare. There are an infinite number of possible invest
ments that, while inefficient, would increase the value of a given com-

28. See JOHN c. Cox & MARK RUBENSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 43645 (1985); FRANK
J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND lNSTRU·
MENTS 645-50 (1992).
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pany's stock. The claim that share-value-increasing but inefficient
bets are not available would fly in the face of capital-market com
pleteness, a fundamental assumption of modern finance theory.29
The abundance of these opportunities for the firm becomes more
obvious if one considers that bets that must be expected to lose money
for the firm as a whole cannot be scarce as long as there are people
willing to take the firm's money. Any risk neutral party should be
willing to be the counter-party of a bet that has a negative expected
value for the firm but a positive expected value for the other party. If
firms were willing to pay an unfair price for bets, so long as they were
risky enough, and so long as they increased share value, there could be
no shortage of parties willing to relieve firms of their money. This sort
of bet would amount to a collusion between equity holders and third
parties to impose costs on the fixed claimants of the firm and split the
benefits among themselves. This sort of behavior is hardly universal
among managers, but not for lack of opportunity - and not because it
would be disloyal to shareholders.
The assumption of complete capital markets is increasingly realis
tic. The emergence of financial derivative markets means practically
unlimited opportunities exist for firms to bet, where they are so in
clined, on possible but low probability future states of the world. De
rivative debacles prove that it is entirely possible for large firms to be
wiped out, as Barings Bank was, by huge derivative losses.30 Yet in the
unlikely event Mr. Leeson's rogue bets on behalf of Earing's had paid
off, its shareholders might have profited handsomely.
B.

Agency Costs

If managers of solvent corporations do not lack the opportunity to
make inefficient bets that would increase shareholder value, then why
do managers rarely bet the company on long shots? It is not because
they are loyally serving the interests of the diversified shareholders
who figure so prominently in the conventional economic analysis of
corporations. Managers loyal to shareholders would make such bets.
In practice, managers apparently make these bets only when firm in
solvency looms.31 When the firm is on the brink of bankruptcy, man-

29. See Michael J. Brennan,
Su=er 1995, at 9.

Corporate Finance over the Past 25 Years, FIN

.

MGMT.

30. See Nicholas Denton, The Barings Crisis: Disaster, Just When Most Things Were
Going Right, FIN TIMEs Feb. 27, 1995, at 3; Peter Martin & F.T. Writers, The Barings Col
lapse: Blunders that Bust the Bank, FIN TIMEs Mar. 24, 1995, at 24; Richard W. Stevenson,
Barings Fiasco: Unbridled Ambition, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 5, 1995, at Bl.
.

,

.

,

31. See Lynn M. LoPuck i & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bank
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993);
Susan Rose-Ack erman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991).
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agers' interests are aligned too well with those of shareholders.32
Managers want to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy and the loss of their
firm-specific human capital.33 For managers, there is little solace in
managing their firm only slightly into bankruptcy. To avoid it, they
will take desperate chances. When the firm is comfortably solvent, the
conventional wisdom is that managers will be more risk averse than
relatively risk neutral shareholders would prefer. Unlike diversified
shareholders, managers typically have specialized much of their per
sonal wealth in one firm. Also unlike shareholders, managers typically
do not participate fully in the upside potential of the firm. Diversified
shareholders, it is often observed, would prefer managers to make all
investments with a positive net discounted present value to sharehold
ers, even if they are very risky. Managers, however, will not do this,
being far more exposed than the shareholders to firm-specific risk. In
fact, if investors owned only the common stock of the firm, they would
prefer that managers undertake even riskier projects that had negative
discounted present values, so long as the expected result would in
crease the value of their stock.
The divergence of the attitudes toward risk of shareholders and
managers gives rise to agency costs in the conventional view of corpo
rations. Manager agents will not take risks shareholder principals
would prefer they take. This standard view goes wrong, however, by
implicitly overvaluing the interests of shareholders.
This over
weighting stems from the assumption that managers should be ana
lyzed as agents of diversified shareholders. But why should this be so?
Shareholders are a legal category, not a natural category of economics.
By analyzing firms in terms of the "shareholders," it is the conven
tionalists who are indulging in reification.34 Legal scholars have ad
justed their thinking to the imperative of diversification that comes
from modern finance theory, but only as far as they may without
leaving the legal category of the "shareholders" behind. The result is
a hybrid that does not quite make economic sense.
Legal scholars have not fully appreciated the extent to which mod
ern finance has left the analysis of Berle and Means's Private Property
and the Modem Corporation outmoded. That influential book still
32. Interests of managers and investors are not usually perfectly aligned.
Meckling, supra note 11.

See Jensen &

33. For discussions of firm-specific human capital, see MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO
OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984); Gary s. Becker, Investment in Human
Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 10 J. POL. ECON. 9 (Oct. Supp. 1962); Harry DeAngelo &
Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 34-38 (1985);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Benjamin Klein et al. , Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 313-19
(1978).
34. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996).
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weighs heavily on corporate law scholarship.
Berle and Means
stressed that the shareholder in the modern corporation, with his mere
atom of property, has no power to control management. Ownership
and control are split, in their vision, producing a radioactive alienation
that threatens to poison economic life. The remedy, they thought, was
to recharacterize firms as virtual public utilities with public duties.35
The rational investor of modern capital asset pricing models, viewed
through the lens of Berle and Means, looks like an aggravated version
of what they feared. Thus the mythology of the lost age of the active
shareholder owner lives on into contemporary corporate scholarship.
The diversified investor of modern finance theory, however, is not a
particularly frightening version of Berle and Means's shareholder. It
(usually an institution) is not a "shareholder" as we have been taught
to think of shareholders at all. The rational investor is diversified
across all classes of capital assets and consequently is, in spite of much
academic cheerleading to the contrary,36 largely passive.37 If this ra
tional investor is the starting point, what agency costs should matter?
The agency costs that matter are properly seen as the divergence
between what self-interested managers do and what rational investors
would have them do. Rational investors will have a stake in that part
of the firm's capital that trades on the debt market, just as they will
have a stake in that part of the firm's capital that trades in the stock
market. Thus when managers fail to be as risk neutral as diversified
shareholders would have them be, this does not necessarily mean they
are more averse to risk than rational investors who own a proportional
stake in the firm's debt would have them be. This does not mean that
the agency costs are trivial, but it does suggest that the conventional
picture of managers as agents of "the shareholders" exaggerates
agency costs. Rational investors will not be as risk-loving as would be
investors holding only equity.

If the bulk of a firm's capital comes from rational investors, inves
tors heavily positioned in the firm's equity might nevertheless yield a
disproportionate influence over managers. In this case, the firm
specific investments of managers might mitigate the pressure toward
excessive risk-taking that risk-preferring shareholders might put on
managers. Public choice theory suggests that smaller groups with nar
rower interests tend to wield more influence than do larger groups
with diffuse interests. Narrow special interest lobbies are able rou
tinely to exercise more influence in the legislative process than diffuse

35.

See

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 327.

See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays Of Warren Buffet: Lessons For
Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 5 (1997); Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Plain English Changing The Corporate Culture, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 718 (1997).
36.

37.

nance,

See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions
85 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997).

and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Fi
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groups such as taxpayers can.38 There is a danger that something
similar may occur in the context of corporate governance. Consider a
public corporation that has two groups of shareholders, one of which
is fully diversified according to the CAPM mandate and another that
has specialized in the corporation's common stock. The tendency of
economic analysis of corporate law is to view this allocation of owner
ship as benign, because it reduces monitoring costs. Mark Roe and
others have argued, for example, that restrictions on ownership by fi
nancial intermediaries of large stakes in public corporations should be
lifted, because strong owners would make good monitors of firm man
agers, who otherwise tend to shirk, self-deal, and otherwise generate
excessive agency costs.39
Having a strong "interest group" focused specifically on the value
of the firm's stock, to the exclusion of the other financial claims
against it, however, will not necessarily be efficient. Especially if the
firm is highly leveraged, the specialized-equity interest group may
have an incentive to use its influence, through the corporate govern
ance system, to get managers to take excessive risks. This would harm
rationally diversified investors in the firm. If the firm has more debt
than equity in its capital structure, rational investors will own more of
the firm's debt than its equity. Investors who own much more of the
firm's equity than its debt may push managers to adopt inefficient
strategies that increase the value of firm stock but decrease the value
of firm debt by more. Thus, it seems entirely plausible that investors
specialized in firm equity will have more influence over management
than rationally diversified investors but quite different incentives re
specting risk. It is partly to avoid incentive problems like these that
leveraged buyouts sometimes impose an ownership structure requiring
investors to buy tranches of the refinanced target's securities, so that
they will be proportionally invested in every level of the target firm's
capital structure after the buyout.40 Put another way, there are likely
to be significant agency costs arising from the divergence of the inter38. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC Goons AND
THEORY OF GROUPS 53-65 (1971); KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 82-85 (1986); Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371,
392 (1983); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA . L. REV. 339 (1988);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, 671 (1995) ( reviewing MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE
PoLmCAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)).

THE

39. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLmCAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 21-25, 263-87 (1994); see also Bernard S. Black, The
Value ofInstitutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895
(1992); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM.117 (1988).
40. See Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LB Os, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy,
in DISCUSSING THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 158, 158-167 ( Donald H. Chew,

Jr. ed. 1998).
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ests of shareholders specializing in ownership of a particular firm , who
act as strong owner monitors, and the interests of rational investors,
who own not only stock but also debt of the firm There is no reason
to expect the interests of the former group to coincide with those of
the latter.
.

C.

Taking Corporate Law Norms Seriously

Law and economics traditionalists might concede that in some cir
cumstances a duty to maximize the value of shares might be inefficient
but still think this is not such a big problem. In this Section, I argue
that this would be a misguided attitude.
The main justification for complacency about the shareholder
value maximization norm is probably the belief that the central prob
lem of corporate law has been, and perhaps will always be, the agency
costs generated by managers who are disloyal to anybody but them
selves. One might think that loyalty by firm managers to shareholder
interests, carried to the point where managers actually make ineffi
cient choices, is unlikely ever to be a serious problem except "in the
vicinity of insolvency," and that problem is already addressed in doc
trine. One could also suppose that the enforcement costs necessary to
bring about perfect compliance of managerial behavior with the
shareholder value maximization norm would be so great that they
would not be justified by the marginal benefits to shareholders. So
shareholders would not want perfect compliance with the norm in any
event.
This is the kind of seemingly practical argument that often appeals
to corporate law scholars. On reflection, however, it is wrongheaded.
In fact, the argument could be rephrased as saying that under real
world conditions, the norm of maximizing shareholder value is a good
approximation of the norm of maximizing the total value of the corpo
ration. The claim would be that managers have sufficient incentives to
be disloyal so that loyalty to shareholders to, the point of inefficiency,
that is to the point where shareholder value is increased at the cost of
decreasing total firm value, is unlikely ever to be a problem. This ar
gument, however, has to invoke implicitly the very norm of firm value
maximization. It defends the shareholder value maximization norm
by implicit reference to what is functioning as the real, underlying
norm, namely the maximization of firm value, or efficiency. If it does
not do that, it is difficult to imagine what the defense of shareholder
value maximization could possibly be. Even if one were to concede
that in standard settings, maximizing shareholder value (as far as man
agers can practically be made to do it) does maximize firm value, what
is the proponent of shareholder value maximization supposed to say to
the hypothetical situation in which maximizing shareholder value does
not maximize firm value? What could possibly be the economic justi-
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fication for maximizing shareholder value under these circumstances
anyway? There is the fallback position - that shareholder value
maximization is what creditors have agreed to and that shareholder
value maximization is just enforcing the corporate contract. But this is
simply begging the question - forgetting conveniently that from the
beginning we are discussing what the gap-filling default rules should
be. By hypothesis, creditors have not agreed to shareholder value
maximization. If they had agreed to it, then there would be nothing to
discuss. (I discuss the claim that corporate contracts with creditors re
quire no gap filling in more detail in the next Section.)
Proponents of shareholder value maximization must, therefore, ei
ther implicitly invoke the firm value maximization/conventional effi
ciency norm if they defend shareholder value maximization by claim
ing it is efficient in all but exotic cases, or implausibly assert that
corporate contracts with creditors are, uniquely in the world of con
tracts, gapless. Furthermore, even if shareholder value maximization
may be the efficient norm in all but exotic circumstances, this would
seem less than a compelling reason for not explicitly using a norm that
should be efficient in all circumstances, even exotic ones. The idea
that corporate managers are under a general duty to maximize the
value of the corporation has the virtues of unity and coherence, which
make it easier to understand and easier to explain.41

41. A defense of shareholder value maximization might take yet another form, but one
that is equally unpersuasive. One might claim shareholder value maximization is what one
might call a supererogatory norm. This is a normative prescription that takes a hyperbolic
form, as if to take into account the probability of human weakness. Thus a general obliga
tion to be generous to the poor might take the form of an ethical prescription (such as some
might read into the New Testament, for example) to give all one's belongings to the poor.
One might think there is little danger that people will take this prescription so much to heart
that they will actually inefficiently impoverish themselves, but they may take it seriously
enough to actually live up to the real underlying obligation, which is to be generous to the
poor. Similarly, one might state an ethical obligation in an unqualified way, also so as to
take account of this "discount," when one in fact would admit of exceptions. Similarly, the
norm "maximize shareholder value" might be the formula that managers, inclined to serve
their own interests rather than those of the firm anyway, would respond to best, not actually
maximizing shareholder value, which would harm themselves and not even be efficient, but,
urged on by the norm's various enforcement mechanisms, take actions to some degree con
sistent with efficiency. There are, however, at least two problems with this view. First, it is
imprecise. Neither managers nor their critics can derive from this supererogatory norm clear
instructions about what they should and should not do. Second, this supererogatory norm is
parasitic upon the norm of efficiency. We must still justify the overstatement of "maximize
shareholder value" in terms of the norm we really adhere to, which presumably is maximiz
ing firm value. This position would seem difficult to hold, however, in instances in which the
maximization of share value and that of firm value actually conflict, which is the case with
which we are primarily concerned.
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Contracts with Shareholders and Creditors and
Duties to Bondholders

Proponents of shareholder wealth maximization disagree with
writers who argue that corporate directors should owe a fiduciary duty
to the bondholders of the corporation as well as to shareholders.42
Shareholder wealth advocates affirm the corporate law doctrine that
while shareholders benefit from the fiduciary duty owed them, bond
holders have a relationship with the corporation that is strictly con
tractual - at least in the sense that managers owe them no fiduciary
duty.43 The idea that creditors, including bondholders, have a relation
ship with the corporation which is strictly contractual is well-estab
lished corporate law doctrine.44
The debate over whether bondholders ought to benefit from a fi
duciary duty has taken place against the obscuring background of ar
guments over "contractual" versus communitarian views of the corpo
ration.45
In this setting, the term "contract" gets confusing.
42. Quite an extensive literature has developed on this topic. See, e.g., Bainbridge, su
pra note 3; William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 667, 735-39 {1984); John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights ofShareholders,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 826 {1988); J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Con
trolling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 16 {1987);
Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The Corporation, the Bondholder and Fiduciary
Duties, 10 J.L. & COM. 187, 209 {1991); Hideki Kanda, Debtholders and Equityholders, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 431 {1992); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1173 {1993); Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Designing an Efficient Fidu
ciary Law, 43 U. TORONTO LJ. 425 {1993); Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4;
Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining The Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and
Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 {1995); Dale B.
Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate
Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1; Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduci
ary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 {1996).
43. Courts have traditionally held that managers owe no fiduciary duty to bondholders.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 {S.D.N.Y.
1989); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988); Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc., 624
P.2d 952, 961 {Kan. 1981); Merriman v. Smith, 599 S.W.2d 548, 552-56 {Tenn. Ct. App. 1979);
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 {Del. Ch. 1986).
44. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §10.05, at 556 {1993); C.
HUGH FRIEDMAN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CORPORATIONS CH. 6-c, 'l!6:247.24
{Westlaw 1984); WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §6-2, at 220 (5th ed. 1993).

45. See Albert H. Barkey, The Financial Articulation ofa Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders
with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47 {1986);
Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595 {1997)
[hereinafter Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty]; Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondhold
ers and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821 {1992)
[hereinafter Brudney, Corporate Bondholders]; Michael E. Debow & Dwight R. Lee, Share
holders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation,
18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 {1993); David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders' Rights and the Case for a
Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1023 (1991); David Millon, Communitarianism in
Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 4, at 1-33; Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4; Mitchell, supra
note 4; Mitchell, supra note 1; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate
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Contractarians argue that the corporation is best understood as a
nexus of contracts and that the relationship of shareholders to the firm
is essentially contractual.46 They also argue that shareholders are
beneficiaries of a fiduciary duty, while bondholders have only a con
tractual relationship with the firm.47 But what does this mean? If the
corporation is a nexus of contracts, is not everyone's relationship
within the nexus contractual? Contractarians must be using the term
contract in two different senses, one literal and one more metaphori
cal.
Corporate-law contractarians argue that those who provide the
firm with inputs agree to certain terms specified by provisions of statu
tory corporate law, the firm's articles of incorporation and bylaws, and
other rules that govern the claims of the various input providers.
These rules are not part of a literal contract, but a contract is still a
good model of the voluntary, self-interested arrangement that consti
tutes a joint business venture among many different parties. "Con
tract" is used here as a metaphor or analogy that captures the essence
of the actual web of voluntary arrangements. The idea is similar to,
but not nearly as fanciful as, the classic description of fundamental so
cial relations as a "social contract."48
It would be impractical for any input provider to specify this
"contract" in complete detail.49 The costs of trying to make the
Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 {1990); O'Connor, Restructuring, supra note 9; Orts,
supra note 5. But see Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 856, 904 n.22.

46. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 37-39; Alchian & Demsetz, supra
note 11, at 787-89 & n.14; Bebchuck, Contractual Freedom, supra note 11, at 1397; Henry N.
Butler, The Contractual Theory ofthe Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV., Summer 1989,
at 99; William J. Camey, The ALi's Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property
Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 900, 905-11 {1993); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites,
and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1706 (1989);
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 310-11.
47. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 38; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at
1443; Macey, supra note 7, at 36-39; C. Robert Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent
Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19 J. CORP. L. 61 (1993); Tauke, supra note
42; Van Der Weide, supra note 42, at 31-32.
48. See, e.g., SOCIAL CONTRACT: EsSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU (Ernest
Barker ed., 1948); THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS (David Bouche &
Paul Kelly eds., 1994); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classi
cal Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 849 n.363 (1985).
49. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres &
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992)
[hereinafter Strategic Contractual Inefficiency]; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 873 (1992); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Judicial Competence and the Interpretation ofIncomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159
(1994); Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1987, 1999 (1996); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract:
A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 216 (1992); Ian Ayres, Making a Difference:
The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391 (1992)
(reviewing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3) [hereinafter Ayres, Making a Difference].
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corporate "contract" complete would be greater than the benefits.
Instead of attempting to spell out completely all of the duties
managers owe shareholders, the standard contractualist now holds
that corporate law subjects managers to a broad fiduciary duty.
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, leading proponents of the
contractual view of the corporation, the fiduciary relationship is
characterized by its open-endedness. Bondholders, Easterbrook and
Fischel would agree, are also participants in the corporate "contract."
They are among the parties who pool their resources in the firm
Unlike shareholders, however, bondholders do have a literal, detailed
contract with the firm. Gaps in the bondholders' contract are smaller
and fewer than those in the shareholders' "contract" because the costs
of specifying the former contract are lower. This difference in cost is
partly due to the difference in the nature of their claims. The fixed
claims of creditors must be protected against a relatively known and
describable set of threats such as fraudulent transfers and
subordination to other creditors. Creditors typically get certain
"boilerplate" proscriptions built into their contracts that limit the risk
that the firm will fail to fulfill its obligations.50
Because the
relationship between the firm and bondholders is not so open-ended,
.

50. On bond covenants generally, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr. et al., Financial Engineer
ing: Why Hedge?, in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 126, 132-34, and (Clif
ford W. Smith, Jr. & Charles W. Smithson eds., 1990); and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B.
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117
(1979). For discussions of shareholder-bondholder conflict, see Avner Kalay, Stockholder
Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (1982); Rose
Ackennan, supra note 31; and George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions ofImper
fect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1992). For discussion of poison put bond cove
nants, see Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and "Super
Poison Put" Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689 (1991), and Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boiler
plate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). Also of interest are the following: Elazar Berkovitch &
E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment In
centives, 45 J. FIN. 765 (1990); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal
Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE LJ. 92; John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A.
Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and
Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1216 n27 (1991); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner,
The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 463 (1996); Mai E. Iskandar-Datta & Douglas R. Emery, An Empirical Investigation
of the Role ofIndenture Provisions in Determining Bond Ratings, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 93
(1994); Ileen Malitz, On Financial Contracting: The Determinants of Bond Covenants, FIN.
MGMT, Summer 1986, at 15; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in
Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931
(1993) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Antitakover Provisions in Bonds]; Marcel Kahan,
The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565 (1995)
[hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds];
Gene Laber, Bond Covenants and Forgone Opportunities: The Case ofBurlington Northern
Railroad Company, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1992, at 71, 72 n.l; Kenneth Lehn & Annette
Poulsen, Contractual Resolution ofBondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts,
34 J.L. & ECON. 645 (1991); ILEEN B. MALITZ, THE MODERN ROLE OF BOND COVENANTS
43-44 (1993); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW
413 (1986).
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bondholders do not need or get the benefits of a fiduciary duty owed
to them, in the standard view. Maximizing the value of equity, on the
other hand, involves entrepreneurs seeing opportunities others do not
see and making the most of them.51 This duty is unavoidably much
more vague.
The corporate "contract" with shareholders thus has great need of
a gap-filling principle provided by the fiduciary duty, while the con

tract with fixed claimants on the firm needs it much less. This point,
stressed by many corporate scholars, is well taken, but tends to be ex
aggerated. It does not imply that contracts with creditors do not also
need a gap-filling principle. All contracts have gaps.52 Contractors
cannot anticipate all future contingencies. While the nature of bond
holder claims is profoundly different from that of equity, both variable
and fixed corporate claimants will have need of principles to fill the
gaps in their incompletely specified voluntary arrangements.
Economic analysts of corporate law, however, taking Easterbrook
and Fischel as exemplary, have tended to suggest that contracts with
debt holders never need gap filling because contracting costs are so
low. Yet this assumption is too implausible to bear scrutiny. For it to
be true, contracting with debt holders would have to be costless, which
obviously it is not.53 In their book The Economic Structure of Corpo
rate Law, Easterbrook and Fischel seem to argue - but they are not
entirely clear on this point - that corporate law reserves fiduciary
duty for voluntary arrangements that are especially open-ended, like
that between the firm and shareholders. In their later work, however,
they seem to take a somewhat different position, arguing that the doc
trine of fiduciary duty corresponds to no distinctive economic reality.54

51. See FREDERICK BANARD HAWLEY, ENTERPRISE AND THE PRODUCTIVE PROCESS
(1907); ISRAEL KlRzNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); Patrick J. Gunning, The Meaning of
Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory: Historical Perspective, in 1 ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC CHANGE (1992).
52. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, supra note 49;
Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 49, at 730; Barnett, supra
note 49; Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 639 (1989); Ayres, Making a
Difference, supra note 49.
53. For bond contracts to be literally gapless, contracting costs would have to be zero
(or vanishingly small) because there are an infinite number of contingencies that potentially
may affect payment and other important features of the bonds. Only if contracting costs
were vanishingly small would it be economical for the bond contract to spell out the parties'
rights and duties under all circumstances that might conceivably arise. See, e.g., Ayres &
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 49; Per-Olof Bjuggren, A Transaction
Cost Perspective on Financial Distress and Capital Structure, 15 IN1L. REV. L. & ECON. 395
(1995); Brudney, Corporate Bondholders, supra note 45; Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield
Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 IN1L. REV. L. & ECON. 183 (1991); Joseph McLaughlin,
Challenges to Underwriters and Their Counsel in the Modern Capital Markets Environment,
792 PLI/CORP 401 (1992).
54. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 91.
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Rather, they argue, the efficient allocations of benefits and duties are
different in different economic settings. Thus in each of the different
settings of business corporations, labor unions, and trusts, fiduciary
duty has a different content.
Yet in all cases, they argue, the principles imposed by the law are
nevertheless those to which rational parties would have agreed ex
ante. In trust law, corporate law, labor law, and other areas, "fiduciary
duty" thus means the same thing but also different things: the same
thing because in each area the law requires fiduciaries to do the effi
cient thing, what rational parties would have agreed to ex ante; but
also different things because in different settings, rational parties
would agree to different things. For example, Easterbrook and Fis
chel suggest that the fiduciary duties of labor union officials are less
stringent than those of ordinary trustees because union members can
hold officials accountable more readily than trust beneficiaries can
trustees.55
In this Article, I am concerned only with fiduciary duty for pur
poses of corporate law. I am not trying to develop here a theory that
works for all of the many applications of fiduciary duty, or even to
suggest such a thing is possible. I do take it, however, that a hypo
thetical bargain analysis - asking what parties would have agreed to
ex ante, as a proxy for what is efficient - is at the core of Easterbrook
and Fischel's analysis of the corporate fiduciary duty. My point is that
this sort of analysis, correctly applied, leads to unexpected results, re
sults whose simplicity and elegance ought to recommend them to
those who prize coherence in legal theory. In particular, hypothetical
bargain analysis is just as applicable to contracts between the firm and
creditors, and other fixed claimants, as it is to the "contract" between
the firm and shareholders. Indeed, it would be strange if the applica
tion of contract law's hypothetical bargain analysis to corporate law
were appropriate for metaphorical (shareholder) contracts but not for
real (bond) contracts. Real contracts are, after all, the sort of con
tracts the default rules of which hypothetical bargain theory was used
to explore in the first place. The obligations owed by managers to
creditors are usually not characterized in law as fiduciary. The gaps in
the specification of obligations to fixed claimants, however, have to be
filled, as a normative matter of efficiency, just as do the larger gaps in
"contracts" with shareholders, by a principle that requires managers to
do what rational parties would have agreed to ex ante.
E.

Fiduciary Duty and Gapless Contracts with Creditors

This appropriate stress on what investors would have agreed to ex

55. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 437 (1993).
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ante decouples two points which together cause confusion. It is natu
ral to suppose that if creditors such as bondholders have essentially an
express contractual relationship with the firm, then there is little gap
filling for any fiduciary principle to do in the creditors' contracts with
the firm , and the fiduciary principle should be thought of mainly as a
principle that completes the shareholders ' contract with the firm. In a
sense, this is correct, but it is also misleading. Even if it is the case that
bondholder contracts with the firm are gapless, it is still a mistake to
imagine that the hypothetical contract from which we derive corporate
fiduciary duty arises from negotiations between or among "the share
holders" and anybody else. It is a logical mistake to infer from the
completeness of bond contracts, and the idleness of fiduciary duty as a
gap fille r in that context, that shareholders, rather than rational inves
tors more generally, are the only parties to the hypothetical corporate
contract. Ironically, this logical mistake, which I believe subtly ani
mates much of corporate contractualist analysis of fiduciary duty, is an
instance of reification. It is as if contractualists imagine there are
shareholders and bondholders in the hall where the corporate contract
is being negotiated. Because contracting costs are lower for bond
holders, they finish negotiating their contracts first and leave. The
shareholders remain and have to settle on the broad fiduciary duty be
cause to specify their contracts completely would be too costly.
Thinking of shareholders in this way, however, reifies them as a sepa
rate class. Sixty years of Berle- and Means-influenced thinking makes
it difficult not to do so. Nevertheless, reifying shareholders this way
has no warrant in modem finance theory. Shareholders as a separate
class, the Berle and Means "owners,"' represent a nostalgic longing for
a political economy that never existed.56 In any event, modem finance
theory has little room for them. Rational investors are not exclusively
shareholders, but are widely diversified across asset classes. The di
versified investors who hypothetically negotiate the corporate contract
will internalize the costs and benefits of different fiduciary rules to the
bonds they hold whether or not there are gaps in bond contracts.
They will only agree to a fiduciary rule that calls for gaps to be filled in
the corporate "contract" with the principle of the maximization of

56. For the flavor of this, see the elegiac last chapter in A.A. BERLE & V.J. PEDERSON,
CLAIMS AND NATIONAL WEALTH 199 {1934). Berle and Pederson opine,

LIQUID

Plainly, there is more than a material loss in this dissolution of the element of property. The
loss is at least equally spiritual. Possession of a liquid asset gives him a momentary possibil
ity to fulfill his desire; and projects that possibility into the future; but the thing it gives him
is precisely that and no more. It does not give him necessarily the possibility to create; and it
precludes (at least to the extent of these assets) any possibility of having a function in terms
of property. There is no escape from the fact that the truly liquid asset is a dead asset; as it
enters into production it becomes less liquid; what has happened has been the splitting of the
atom of property so that he has the dead part, and someone else the living.

Id. at 203. The influence of this kind of progressive romanticism in American legal thought

deserves an essay in its own right.
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firm value, not shareholder value, even if we imagine bond contracts
were gapless.
So far I have only sketched the argument for taking the maximiza
tion of firm value as the principle to which these rational parties would
agree as the appropriate norm for filling gaps in corporate contracts.
In the following Part, I argue in more detail that this is the rule ra
tional investors in corporations would choose as a gap filler.
II.

THE HYPOTHETICAL BARGAIN AMONG RATIONAL
CORPORATE !NVESTORS

In their influential book on corporate law,57 Easterbrook and
Fischel express the standard view that "the holders of [residual
claims]," who "bear the marginal risks of the firm[,] . . . have the best
incentives to make the optimal investment and management decisions
[for the firm] - not perfect, just best."58 In fact, this standard view is
quite wrong, and the confident assumption of this proposition as
economic truth is the source of perhaps subtle, but deep and
persistent, confusion in corporate law scholarship. In fact, as the
examples above show, the incentives of residual claimants are too risk
preferring to be efficient. They would have managers increase the
value of residual claims even if it decreased the total value of financial
claims against the firm, and they would always have these incentives,
not just in unusual cases. So who does have the best incentives to
make optimal investment and management decisions for the firm? It
turns out this question has a pleasing answer. It is rational investors.
Since they are proportionally invested in all the financial claims on the
firm, just as CAPM mandates, they have these optimal incentives.
Thus the diversified portfolio that CAPM mandates is also the
portfolio which, when held by rational investors, gives them precisely
the correct incentives to make, or to influence management to make,
"the optimal investment and management decisions" for the firm.
Rational investors, not shareholders, have the best incentives.
Why do Easterbrook and Fischel miss this point? Were one to ask
them, "best of whose incentives to make optimal decisions?" their an
swer would presumably be, "best among shareholders, preferred
shareholders, junior creditors, senior creditors, and so on - best of
the various classes in the capital structure of the firm."59 But these

57. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3.
58. Id. at 91.
59. I do not address the complicated issues involved in duties firm decisionmakers might
owe to workers, communities, and "other constituencies" of the corporation. This is because
conventionally, human capital is not included in the portfolios that modem portfolio theory
describes. This is obviously a serious limitation of modem portfolio theory. Ravi Jaganna
than and Zhenyu Wang argue that if the market index is redefined to include human capital
and betas are allowed to vary with the cyclical fluctuations in the economy, beta becomes a
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categories are imposed by law, not finance. Easterbrook and Fischel,
for all their economic sophistication, remain trapped in the antique
world of Berle and Means. To maximize the value of its portfolio, a
rational investor must be shareholder, senior bondholder, and every
thing in between, all at once. To have the right incentives to maximize
the value of the firm, the rational investor must have the correct incen
tives respecting investment and management decisions of the firm.
And the rational investor will have those incentives as a natural con
sequence of diversifying its portfolio to maximize value. Thus diversi
fication theory, management's incentives to maximize the value of in
vestment in the firm, and the normative content of corporate law are
all tightly linked, but not in the way economic corporate law scholar
ship has heretofore explained. It is not "the shareholders," but ra
tional investors, by virtue of diversifying to maximize the value of
their portfolios, who have the best (indeed, with the usual strong as
sumptions, perfect) incentives to maximize the value of the firm.
Once this point is grasped, a socially efficient corporate law norm
is not difficult to formulate. It is simply that managers should make
the decision, such as the investment choice, that maximizes the value
of the firm.60 This does not necessarily entail maximizing the value of
the residual claims, such as common stock, of the firm but rather en
tails maximizing the total value of all financial claims on the firm. In
the example in Part I above, managers would be violating this rule by
choosing Investment 2 over Investment 1, even if Investment 2 were
better for shareholders. In the next Section, I show how hypothetical
bargain analysis leads to this result.
much better predictor of returns on assets. See Ravi Jagannathan & Z henyu Wang, The
Conditional CAPM and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns, 51 J. FIN. 3 (1996). One

could imagi ne a very ambitious theory that would defe nd a general version of fiduciary duty
that would fill all gaps in the corp orate contract depending on what would max imiz e the to·
tal value of all assets, including human capital, that were contractually committed to the cor
poration. Such a theory might, however, not give workers more protection than they cur
rently have. M oreover, hypothetical contract analysis that uses highly diversified investor s
a s its personnel i s more appealing i n settl ing gap-fill ing principles fo r contracts with financial
claimants than it would be fo r firm contracts with human capital investors. Treating share
holders as if they were diversified across asset classes is not grossly unrealistic, and it is not
normatively offensive, because it treats shareholders as doing what they should be doing
anyway. Considerations such as the decreasing marginal utility of wealth become relevant,
however, in considering defa ult rules governin g confl icts of financial and human capital pro
viders.

60. Cf. Barkey, supra note 45. Bark ey argues fo r a duty of " global wealth max imiz a
tion" which is similar to the proposal I make in this Article. He argues, however, that this
duty follows from Black-Scholes option-pricing theory, mak ing a connection I am not sure I
fo llow. He seems to mean that under option- pricing theory, a bondholder is in a sense a re
sidual claimant and as such should benefit from a fiduciary duty. As I ex plain in Section
IV. A.l, I think the idea that fiduciary duty should fo llow from the residual status of a claim
is just a mistake. He also seems to reject the idea that investors woul d be indifferent to
maximiz ing firm value via wealth transfe rs from bondholders to stock holders or vice versa.
Instead, he suggests the firm should have to compensate bondholders fo r such " ex propr ia
tions." I do not endorse that view. I also find Barkey' s article opaque at several crucial
points. See id. at 69.
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Rational Corporate Investors

Hypothetical bargain analysis61 determines what rule hypothetical
investors in a public corporation would agree to ex ante to fill gaps in
the corporate contract. The first step in the analysis is to characterize
the investors and describe what rational behavior on their part is. The
second step is to explain which corporate law norm rational investors
of the sort described would pick.
I take corporate investors for purposes of this analysis to be per
fect adherents of CAPM - the Capital Assets Pricing Model. CAPM
is not uncontroversial, but it remains the leading asset pricing model
and a central tenant of modern finance.62 In any event, my purpose
here is not to defend CAPM but to use CAPM as the best available
description of rational investment behavior.
CAPM is familiar to modern corporate law scholars. It is standard
in the corporate law literature to take into account the consequence of
CAPM that rational investors will be highly diversified. For example,
in Easterbrook and Fischel's critique of laws regulating takeovers and

61. The literature on hypothetical bargaining theory is huge. See, e.g., BRUCE
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-72 (1984); RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-85 (3d ed. 1986); Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in In
complete Contracts, supra note 49; Bainbridge, supra note 9; Barnett, supra note 49; Lisa
Bernstein, Social Nonns and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993);
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom, supra note 11, at 1824; Daniel P. Bradney, Hypo
thetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 LAW & PHIL. 235 (1991); David Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains: The Normative Structure ofContract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991);
Clark, supra note 46; John C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:
An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Coleman et al., supra note
52; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REV. 271, 271-79, 283-99 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Cor
porate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 702 (1982); [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fis
che� Corporate Control Transactions]; Theodore Eisenberg, Symposium on the Law and
Economics of Bargaining Commentary on 'On The Nature of Bankruptcy': Bankruptcy and
Bargaining, 75 VA. L. REV. 205 (1989); Thomas Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature
of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155
(1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract De
fault Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615 (1990); Robert A. Long, Jr., A Theory of Hypothetical Con
tract, 94 YALE LJ. 415 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Courts and Corporations: A Comment
on Coffee, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1692 (1989); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts In
Unincorporated Finns, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537 (1997); Michael B. Rappaport, The
Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed
Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation In
Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987); Ayres, Making a Difference, supra note

49.
62. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD s. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISISITONS 101 (2d ed. 1995); Richard A. Booth, Stockholders,
Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53
Bus. LAW. 429, 478 (1998); Jeffrey S. Glaser, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Risk Valua
tion, Judicial Interpretation, and Market Bias, 50 Bus. LAW. 687, 716 (1995); D. Gordon
Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons From Kmart, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 1037, 1066 (1996); Cheol S. Eun, The Benchmark Beta, CAPM, and Pricing Anoma
lies, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 330 (1994); Risk and Return: Capital-asset Pricing Model,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1991, at 72; Three Pioneers ofFinance, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 1990, at 99.

·

240

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:214

tender offers, they consider how different rules would affect diversi
fied stock investors who own stock in both takeover targets and poten
tial acquirers.63 A law that resulted in losses to the value of acquirer
stock that were greater than gains realized in the value of target stock
would be inefficient from the viewpoint of the diversified stockholder.
There is little disagreement that shareholder welfare has to be consid
ered in light of the fact that in modem finance theory, rational share
holders are diversified.
While corporate law scholars assume that CAPM tells sharehold
ers to diversify, they usually seem to assume, however, that this means
merely that rational shareholders should own stock in at least a certain
number of different firms.64 The diversification that CAPM actually
prescribes goes well beyond this. A striking result of CAPM is its
demonstration that a rational investor will hold a "market portfolio"
and either buy risk-free assets or borrow at the risk-free rate, as neces
sary to maximize portfolio value in light of the particular rational in
vestor's attitude toward risk.65 The market portfolio is the aggregation
of everyone's financial holdings. Since under CAPM every investor's
portfolio of risky assets is identical, every rational investor must own a
slice, bigger or smaller, of the market portfolio. Thus under CAPM,
every rational investor holds the same portfolio of risky assets: each
risky asset portfolio is a bigger or smaller slice of the same pie. But,
bigger or smaller, each slice has the same ingredients and has them in
the same proportions as every other slice and as the pie as a whole.
The weights of various types of risky assets in each rational investor's

63. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man
agement to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 {1981).
64. See Smith, supra note 37.
65. For some discussions of CAPM in the last ten years, see THOMAS E. COPELAND & J.
FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 185-211 (2d ed. 1983); Ed

ward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Con
tract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189 {1995); Law
rence A. Cunningham, Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 719 {1997); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Introduction to the Warren Buffett Symposium
Papers, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 221 {1997); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46
J. FIN. 1575 {1991); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the
Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 1 {1993); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R.
French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427 {1992); Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 16 INTL. REV.
L. & ECON. 417 {1996); Glaser, supra note 62; Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives:
The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102
YALE L.J. 1457, 1498 & n.247 (1993); Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of
Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship In
vesting, 20 J. CORP. L. 413 {1995); Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Pun
ishment Fit the Crime, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 {1994); Robert F. Reilly, The Use and
Misuse of CAPM, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 29 {1994); Smith, supra note 37; Lynn A. Stout,
How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncer
tainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475 {1997); and Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A
Lawyer's Guide to Modem Valuation Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L.
457 {1996).
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portfolio are thus the same under CAPM. If stock represents 25% of
all assets in the capital market, every rational investor will have a port
folio of risky assets that consists of 25% stock by weight. If stock of
XYZ corporation represents 1/nth of a percent of all assets in the capi
tal market, the ideally rational investor would hold 1/nth of a percent
of her portfolio in XYZ stock. While the risky asset portfolios of ra
tional investors under CAPM are identical, investors will differ, ac
cording to their risk preferences, in the amount they invest in risk-free
assets or how much they borrow at the risk-free rate ("leveraging") to
buy more risky assets. CAPM therefore pictures rational investors as
being far more diversified than just owning twenty different kinds of
stock, even though corporate law scholars often incorrectly assume
that CAPM's diversification mandate is fulfilled for practical purposes
by owning twenty or so different types of stock.66 Ideal CAPM inves
tors in fact are diversified across all classes of capital assets and hold
particular assets in proportion to the percent that the class of assets
represents of the capital market as a whole.
Critics of CAPM often object to its idealization and the lack of re
alism in its assumptions.67 While not unassailable, CAPM has empiri
cal support,68 and perhaps more telling, no better, inconsistent theory
seems currently available. Whatever the validity of criticisms of
CAPM on grounds of realism might be, however, they would seem out
of place in a critique of hypothetical bargain analysis, a type of analy
sis which inevitably involves idealization. Hypothetical bargain analy
sis looks at what ideally rational parties would do if they knew certain
things ex ante. To reject the exercise because it employs idealizations
is to reject the hypothetical bargain methodology entirely. One may
certainly do this. A general defense of hypothetical bargain theory is
beyond the scope of this Article. My point is that, as a standard tool
of economic analysis of corporate law and the basis of current thinking
on the economics of corporate fiduciary duty, hypothetical bargain

66. See Smith, supra note 37, at 22.
67. See LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 195-208
(1991); Brennan, supra note 29; Eun, supra note 62; Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LJ. 239, 253-56 (1984);
Jagannathan & Wang, supra note 59, at 4; Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Risk and Return
Revisited, 23 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., No. 3, at 9 (1997); Stout, supra note 65; Richard Roll,

What Every CFO Should Know About Scientific Progress in Financial Economics: What Is
Known and What Remains to Be Resolved, FIN. MGMT., June 23, 1994, at 69; Robert
Teitelman, The Revolt Against Free-Market Finance. (A Group of Thinkers and Practitioners
Reject Current Free-Market Economic Beliefs), INS1TIUTIONAL INVESTOR, June, 1992, at 37;
Wayne H. Wagner, Ten Myths and Twenty Years ofBetas, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Sept. 22,
1994, at 79; Beta Beaten, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1992, at 87; Tales from the FAR Side Financial Markets' Evaluation of Risk Determines the Way Firms Invest. What If the Markets
Are Wrong? IJudging Risk, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 86.

68. A nice assessment of the current status of CAPM debate can be found in the most
recent edition of the classic popular investors' guide, BURTON G. MAI.KIEL, A RANDOM
WALK DOWN WALL STREET 251-76 (1996).
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analysis leads to results different from those usually supposed. Since
CAPM is the theoretical ground for using diversified investors in eco
nomic analysis of corporate law at all, it makes sense to model inves
tors as complying with the CAPM mandate closely. To do otherwise
would require some theoretical justification, and none is apparent.
Defenders of shareholder value maximization who want to rely on hy
pothetical bargain analysis would have to have some reason for using
shareholders rather than rational CAPM investors in their model, but
if they are invoking CAPM for supposing shareholders are diversified,
it is arbitrary not to model investors as being as diversified as CAPM
would have them be. If we take rational CAPM investors as the right
personnel for our model, then the next question is, what corporate law
norm would they choose?
To begin to answer this question, one can first note that under
CAPM, rational investors will not divide themselves up into stock
holders and bondholders. So when we imagine the hypothetical bar
gaining setting in which various claimants on the corporation are set
tling on their gap-filling principle, we do not have to distinguish
between stockholders and bondholders. Under CAPM, we have in
vestors whose risky asset portfolios are identical as far as their weights
are concerned. They differ from one another only in the size of their
portfolios, and in how they lever or unlever them to take account of
their risk preferences.
B.

The Efficient Corporate Law Norm

Rational investors thus have risky asset portfolios that are identical
as regards the weights of various risky assets. Consequently, they will
not find it hard to agree on a gap-filling rule. They will agree on a
simple rule: managers should make the choice that will maximize the
value of rational investors' diversified portfolios.
This result conflicts with the accepted wisdom of what efficiency
prescribes for a corporate law norm. If our gap-filling principle is to
"maximize the value of rational investors' diversified portfolios," then
shareholder value will not always be maximized. Consider again the
rational investor's portfolio of risky assets. Consisting as it does of a
representative sampling of all capital assets on the market, it will in
clude both stocks and bonds of every firm, including XYZ corpora
tion. If XYZ managers face a choice between two investments (such
as Investment 1 and Investment 2 above) - the second of which will
increase the value of stock, but by less than it decreases the value of
bonds, and the first of which will increase the sum of the value of stock
and bonds, even though it would increase stock value by less than the
second investment - rational investors will unambiguously prefer that
managers choose the first investment. The first investment would not
maximize the value of investors' shares, but it would maximize the
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value of their diversified portfolios. Rational investors in the hypo
thetical contract setting would reject the norm "maximize shareholder
value," because it would result (to the extent it was followed) in some
investment choices that reduced the value of their diversified portfo
lios. Their preferred instruction to managers would instead be to "do
things that increase the value of our diversified portfolios." Managers
could then do things that reduced the value of bonds (unless prohib
ited by actual contract terms) only if they increased the value of stock
by more.
C.

From Portfolios to Corporations

The efficient norm for corporate law is different from shareholder
wealth maximization not only in substance but in form as well. Be
cause the norm is derived from what rational CAPM investors would
choose in a hypothetical bargain, and these investors are diversified
across classes of capital assets, the norm cannot be formulated as be
ing owed exclusively or primarily to any one legal class of asset hold
ers. If the object is to maximize the value of a diversified portfolio of
securities, obviously a norm that requires the value of a particular as
set class such as equity shares to be maximized is bound to fail. This
leaves the question of how the efficient corporate law norm should be
formulated.
The history of corporate law offers an attractive possibility. Until
well into this century, lawyers and judges69 conceived of the corporate
fiduciary duty as running to "the corporation" itself rather than pri
marily or exclusively to the shareholders.70 These earlier commenta-

69. Chancellor Allen, however, seems to be hinting at this idea in the language he uses
in Credit Lyonnais:
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is
not merely the agent of the residual risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enter
prise . . . . [T]he board [of directors] . . . had an obligation to the community of interest that
sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maxi
mize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity.
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. Civ.A.12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (emphasis added) reprinted in 17 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1099, 1155, 1157 (1992).
70. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 138 (1972) (holding that directors have a
fiduciary duty to promote the interests of the corporation); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 2 A.2d 225
(Del. Ch. 1938), affd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (holding that directors are charged with an un
yielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders); HENRY WINTHROP
BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 122a (1927) (stating that directors and
other officers of a corporation have a fiduciary relation toward the corporation); 1 R.
FRANKLIN BALOITI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.10, at 4-233 (2d ed. 1997) ("Directors owe a duty of
loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders . . . . ); 3 BETH A. BUDAY & BAIL A.
O'GRADNEY, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 837.50,
at 181 (rev. vol. 1994) (stating that directors must act for the benefit of the corporation and
the shareholders); 11 SIMON M. LORNE, ACQUISI1TIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § lA.02[1](6] (1999) (stating that the beneficiary of the
"
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tors did not have modem financial theory in mind. Nor did their con
ception of the fiduciary duty as being owed to the corporate entity
arise from any solicitude toward claimants other than shareholders.
Nevertheless, corporate legal history offers a convenient device for
conceptualizing the norm that emerges from hypothetical bargain
analysis.
Hypothetical bargain analysis suggests rational shareholders would
prefer a norm that would have managers maximize the value of an ab
straction, namely the sum of the values of the various components of
rationally diversified portfolios. This abstraction is mathematically
simple, but it is abstract nonetheless. In trying to embody such an ab
stract norm in legal rules, one must tum to an abstract entity that can
stand as the object of the duty. It cannot be efficient to make the
holders of one asset class the sole beneficiaries of a maximization
duty, unless it is always efficient to maximize the value of that class of
assets, or at least unless exceptions to such a rule could be clearly de
fined. As this is not the case, the corporate norm must be formulated
in some other way. The natural alternative is to think of the duty as
being owed to the corporation itself.
As historians of corporate law know, early twentieth-century cor
porate law theorists devoted astonishing energy to developing the the
ory of the corporate entity or personality.71 Much of this work will
strike the contemporary reader as obscure and metaphysical. The
heavy influence of idealist philosophy accounts for some of this obscu
rity.72 Economists will naturally find old idealist conceptions of the

fiduciary duty is unclear, however three choices exist: the corporate entity itself, the share
holders generally, or the minority shareholders); 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACITCE 2d § 47:27, at 47-71 {1997) ("[O]fficers of corporations,
are fiduciaries as to corporate stockholders as well as to the corporation itself . . . . "); 18B
AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS § 1689, at 541 (1985) (stating that "it is well established that
[directors] occupy a fiduciary, or more exactly a quasi-fiduciary, relation to the corporation
and its stockholders").
71. See W. Jethro Brown, The Personality ofthe Corporation and the State, 21 L.Q. REV.
365 (1905); George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17
COLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917); George F. Deiser, The Juristic Person (pts. 1-3), 57 U. PA. L.
REV. 131, 216, 300 (1908-1909); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality, 35 YALE L J 655 (1926); W.M. Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 L.Q. REV 90
(1911 ); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 217 (1985); Harold J. Laski, The Personality ofAssociations, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 404 (1916); Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34
MICH. L. REV. 597, 599-600 (1936); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (pts. 1 &
2), 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 347 (1910-1911); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the
Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987); Max Radin, The
Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932); Bryant Smith,
Legal Personality, 37 YALE LJ. 283 (1928); Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM.
L. REV. 594 (1924); Martin Wolff, On the Nature ofLegal Persons, 54 L.Q. REV. 494 (1938).
72 See 0. GIERKE, POLmCAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (F. w. Maitland
trans., 1st ed. 1922); FREDERICK RALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY 49-72 {1930); H.J.
LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 250-91 (1921); F.W. Maitland, Moral Person
ality and Legal Personality, in 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS 304, 315 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
.

.
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corporation off-putting,73 but the idealist taint on the idea of the cor
porate entity is just a contingency of the history of ideas. One need
not think of the corporate entity in ways empirically oriented utilitari
ans are apt to find ridiculous, such as its having some difficult-to
define quality of personhood. To do important work, the corporation
need not have an ontological status of the sort idealist philosophers or
their intellectual heirs are wont to ascribe to collective entities of vari
ous sorts, such as states and social classes.
Rather, one can think of the corporation in the same way utilitari
ans typically think of collective entities in their usual analyses of policy
questions. Many legal economists evaluating policy choices will re
gard as normatively preferable the choice that is Kaldor-Hicks supe
rior to other options.74 One state of the world is Kaldor-Hicks supe
rior to another if moving to that state would generate gains that could
more than compensate losses from the move.75 As a kind of shorthand
for this result, the legal economist may say "society" is better off for
the making of a Kaldor-Hicks superior move. What she means, how
ever, is only that the sum of individual utilities is greater in the Kal
dor-Hicks superior world than in its alternative. She is not claiming
some peculiar ontological status for society, and then claiming "it" is
somehow better off. Economists are rarely accused of "reification"
because they refer to "society."76 Addition is not reification.
Yet using "society" in this sense is still normatively useful. Con
sider how one would formulate a duty one might wish to put on poli
cymakers to make the efficient choice.77 One could not formulate that
duty as O\ving to one class of individuals more than to another, if effi
ciency were the goal. If one wanted policymakers to be duty bound to
choose efficiently, one would find useful some abstract noun such as
"society" to stand in as the object of the duty to maximize the sum of
individual utilities. In fact, it is commonplace in utilitarian thinking to
use abstract collective entities to serve as shorthand for the sum of in-

The very embodiment of reification, of course, is G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF SPIRIT (Arnold V. Miller trans., 5th ed. l'f'77).
73. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12; Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 863
n.22.
74. See POSNER, supra note 61, at 13; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 48-115 (1981).
75. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND Tiffi LAW 98 (1988); POSNER,
supra note 61, at 3-26; Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interper
sonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550-51 (1939).
76. Perhaps "rarely" is an exaggeration. For criticisms of reification in various contexts,
see Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1565, 1578-79 (1993) (reification of "corporation"); Charles A. Reich, The Individual
Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1441 (1991) (of "society"); and Steven L. Winter, The Meaning
of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 334 (1992) (of "state").
77. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (1963).
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dividual interests. To say "society" corresponds to everybody seems
inaccurate, since utility maximization, or more correctly wealth maxi
mization, might require advancing one person's interest ahead of an
other's. In fact, "society" used this way corresponds more nearly to an
abstract quantity, the sum of the respective utilities or wealth of indi
viduals.
The corporation can be thought of this way as well. The corporate
entity thought of this way has an economic meaning if we conceive of
it simply as shorthand for the sum of the values of all the various vol
untary arrangements that make it up. To say that a manager owes a
duty to "the corporation" to maximize the value of the corporation is
simply one way of stating a gap-filling principle that applies to all of
the contracts that make up the corporation. It is no more mysterious
to say this than it is to say that a policymaker has a duty to do the
thing that will make "society" best off, where society is understood to
mean the sum of the interests of individuals who make up society.
Given its somewhat lurid historical associations with idealist phi
losophy, it is understandable that empirically oriented legal econo
mists view the corporate "entity" with suspicion.78 There certainly
have been those who have reified the corporation.79 My proposed
conception of the corporate entity, however, is economically meaning
ful and entails no disreputable ontological commitments. A reformu
lated duty to maximize the value of the corporation involves no reifi
cation. It is merely a shorthand way of expressing a duty to maximize
the sum of the value of the various financial claims on the corporation,
which, to be ontologically fastidious, are only indirect claims on other
participants in the firm's enterprise.
D.

"Other Constituencies" ofthe Corporation

Corporate law scholars have devoted much attention in the last
several years to the question of what duties, if any, managers have to
constituencies of the corporation other than shareholders. The reason
for this is largely historical. Corporate-control market activity in the
1980s and early 1990s led to changes of control of many American
firms. One of the main motives for many of these transactions was to
reallocate firm resources to more efficient uses, a project that involved
terminating workers and closing facilities that could no longer be used
profitably.
Management threatened by control transactions and
workers and other interests in communities where plants might be
closed thus had a common interest in getting state legislatures to enact
78. For denunciations of reification, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 1112; Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 67 (1995); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311.
79. See supra notes 71-72.
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antitakeover legislation. A prominent feature of state antitakeover
legislation was provisions that enable firm managers to take into ac
count the interest of constituencies of the corporation such as workers,
creditors, and local communities in deciding whether to oppose a hos
tile takeover. Academic commentators tended to polarize in their
public-policy evaluations of these statutes.
This Article, however, bears only indirectly on this debate. This is
because finance theory presently has little to add to the weighing of
the interests of, say, production line workers against those of financial
claimants against the corporation. There are compelling theoretical
reasons arising directly from modem finance theory for treating pro
viders of capital to the firm as being diversified in a certain way. This
Article stresses that in light of modem finance theory it is as incorrect
to treat shareholders and bondholders as separate opposing interests
for purposes of determining default rules as it would be to assume
shareholders are not diversified. Any model that proposes to fill gaps
in the contracts of providers of capital to the firm should take the con
sequences of modem finance theory seriously into account.
This does not mean, however, that with no additional theoretical
warrant, we can somehow extend the analysis to all providers of inputs
to the firm. In some very general sense, one who uses efficiency as a
normative guide should ask, does a permissive regime for corporate
control transactions, for example, hurt some participants in corporate
enterprises more than it helps others?80 Some commentators have ex
amined Pareto-efficient rules under which losers in corporate transac
tions would be compensated by winners.81 These debates, however,
are more ambitious than anything I attempt here. There is as yet no
consensus about how to define legal duties among all constituencies of
the corporation, particularly workers and other providers of human
capital. This Article stresses, however, that the current prevailing po
sition, that the shareholders are and ought to be the primary benefici
aries of the fiduciary duty, is indefensible in light of standard financial
theory, even now, before more difficult and perhaps intractable ques
tions about the relations of financial and nonfinancial inputs to the
firm have been entirely resolved. The difficulty of the latter, more
global set of questions should not obscure what clarity may be brought
to the duties owed to financial claimants on the corporation. Some fu
ture theory may elegantly model and explain the firm and its relations
to all the diverse financial and nonfinancial parties in its entire net
work of contracts. We already have, however, in CAPM a powerful

80. Jeffrey Macintosh, for example, organizes possible efficient forms of corporate fidu
ciary duty into several categories, including Pareto-superior and Kaldor-Hicks efficient
forms of the duty. See Macintosh, supra note 42, at 429-30. My proposal would presumably
fall into the Kaldor-Hicks category. But cf. supra note 59 (giving an example where Kaldor
Hicks efficiency may be an inappropriate norm).
81. See Macintosh, supra note 42, at 435-40.
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theory about rational financial behavior. Shareholder value maximi
zation is not a plausible candidate for fiduciary duty under that theory.
III. THE INDIFFERENCE OF PUBLIC CORPORATION LAW TO
DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES

Conceiving of the corporate law norm as maximizing the value of
the corporation has some interesting consequences. The fiduciary
gap-filling rule that flows from hypothetical bargain analysis mandates
maximization of firm value, but the rule is indifferent among equally
efficient distributions among different asset classes of public corpora
tions.82 When one considers the permissive attitude corporate law
takes in the public corporation context toward gap-filling decisions
with distributional consequences, this formulation of fiduciary duty
seems descriptive of, or at least consistent with, some actual practice.
I briefly consider below three areas where this thesis is borne out:
leveraged buyouts (LBOs), targeted share repurchases, and recapitali
zations affecting preferred stock. The doctrines that produce the judi
cial results found in these areas differ, but one could regard the princi
ple as the same. Unless express terms of the corporate contract
provide otherwise, managers may take steps to maximize firm value
regardless of the horizontal or distributional effects on particular as
sets classes.
A.

LB Os, Bondholders, and Fiduciary Duties

In the late 1980s, the RJR/Nabisco transaction and other large
LBOs generated considerable controversy. One debated feature of
LBOs was the losses they could cause to the market value of bonds
outstanding when acquirers bought the target firm Acquirers often
financed LBOs partly through the issuance of new debt by the target
firm Even if existing debt of the target was senior to the new debt,
the market value of the old debt could fall, partly because in practice
absolute priority is usually not strictly observed in bankruptcy.83 Thus
.

.

82. The efficient gap-filling rule mandates that the size of the corporate pie be maxi
mized but does not mandate any particular division of the pie among various classes of in
vestors in the corporation.
83. See John D. Ayers, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963
(1989); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours
of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHl:. L. REV. 738 (1988); Carliss Y. Baldwin & Scott P.
Mason, The Resolution of Claims in Financial Distress: The Case of Massey Ferguson, 38 J,
FIN 505 (1983); Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute
Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN 1457, 1468 (1990); Julian R. Franks &
Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J, FIN. 747
(1989); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Prior
ity and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1987); Alan Schwartz, A Contract
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1836 {1998); David A. Skeel,
.

.

The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's Contribution Rule Doctrine After

Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 {1989); Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Absolllle Priority,
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the new debt, even though junior, could effectively dilute the claims of
senior bondholders.
This effect was particularly stark in the RJR/Nabisco deal, where
bondholders reportedly lost approximately $40 million in market
value from the pretransaction value of their bonds.84 Bondholders of
RJR/Nabisco sued their issuer, claiming that by approving the LBO,
the target board had violated a fiduciary or similar duty that they
owed bondholders.85 While bondholders lost this case, they won the
support of some academic commentators. David Millon, for example,
has argued that bondholders in cases like RJR/Nabisco ought to bene
fit from fiduciary protection. Managers should be regarded, he argues,
as having a duty to treat shareholders and bondholders according to a
rule of Pareto-optimality.86 That is, managers should not be able to
make an investment decision, such as to approve an LBO, even if it
would make shareholders better off, if it would make bondholders
worse off.
To test Millon's claim, it might seem we should ask whether
Pareto-optimality is the rule to which hypothetical shareholders and
bondholders would agree as a gap-filling principle for the corporate
contract.87 As I noted above, the main response of economic analysts
to arguments of Millon and other bondholder advocates has been to
insist that bondholders have in effect contracted out of any fiduciary
protection in the hypothetical bargain.88 In this view, bondholders
and the Pricing ofRisky Debt Claims, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 239 (1977); Lawrence A. Weiss, The
Bankruptcy Code and Violations ofAbsolute Priority, 4 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 71 (1991).

84. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); BRYAN BURROWS & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF
RJR NABISCO (1990); Bratton, supra note 50; Nancy W. Graml, Bondholder Rights in Lev
eraged Buyouts in the Aftermath a/Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 29
AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Deal
ing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993); Kahan & Klausner, Anti
takeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 50, at 932 n.1; Kahan & Klausner, The Qualified
Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, supra note 50; Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a
Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996); F. John Stark III et
al., "Marriott Risk": A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from Bondhold
ers to Stockholders, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 503; Kenneth N. Gilpin, Bid for RJR Na
bisco Jolts Bonds, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1988, at D11; Wayne E. Green & Sonja Steptoe,
Metropolitan Life Joins Backlash Against Leveraged Buy-Outs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1 8, 1 988,
at Cl; Glenn Ruffenach & Randall Smith, RJR Nabisco Gets Major Jolt in Debt Ratings,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at A3; Ames Stemgold, Koh/berg Leads Latest Nabisco Bids,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1988, at Dl.
85. See Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1508.
86. See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4, at 267-68.
87. See Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts ofInterest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 761 (1978); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, supra note 61, at 702; McDaniel, supra note 50, at 447; Morey W. McDaniel,
Bondholders And Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 246 (1988).
88. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 52; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at
1443; Macey, supra note 7, at 36-39; Kenneth Lehn, The Lessons of Marriott, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 11, 1993, at A14.
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have agreed to shareholder value maximization as the gap-filling rule,
or contracts with bondholders are assumed to be effectively gapless.
In either event, bondholders do not enjoy fiduciary protection. This
response, however, is weak. The argument that bond contracts need
no gap filling, which I criticize above, seems especially disingenuous in
the LBO context, when one considers the surprise with which
bondholders and bond markets greeted the financial innovations
spawned by LBOs.89 One could also argue that the emergence of
event risk covenants,90 devices intended to protect existing
bondholders from losses caused by LBOs, is evidence that creditors
had not anticipated bond losses by LBOs.91 If one grants that bond
contracts do require a gap-filling principle, then the question of what it
should be remains.
If one envisions the appropriate gap-filling principle as emerging
from a hypothetical contract negotiation between bondholders and
shareholders, then Millon's proposal might seem correct. Bondhold
ers, one might argue, would have little reason to agree to anything less
than Pareto-optimality, since such a rule would not allow managers to
favor shareholders at their expense. Yet proponents of shareholder
wealth maximization might equally well contest this point. They might
argue that bondholders would agree to a rule that shareholder value
be maximized, subject only to the express constraints in bond con
tracts. Bondholders would prefer to have no open-ended protection,
they could argue, because the cost of this protection to them in terms
of lower interest rates would be too high.92

89. See Christopher Farrell, Bondholders Are Mad as Hell - and They're Not Going to
Take It Anymore, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 82; Christopher Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts
Clobber Blue-Chip Bondholders New Debt to Finance-or Fend Off-Corporate Raiding
Sends Prices Tumbling, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 113; Wayne E. Green & Sonja Steptoe,
Metropolitan Life Joins Backlash Against Leveraged Buy-Outs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1988,
at Cl; Gary Hector, The Bondholders' Cold New World. (Securities Devalued Because of
Leveraged Buyouts and Other Debt-Riddled Deals), FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1989, at 83; James E.
Lebherz, Taking a Look Back at the Year in Fixed-Income Securities, WASH. POST, Jan. 1,
1989, at H6; Paul Richter, The Deal That Burst the Bubble for KKR Buyouts: The Bank
ruptcy Filing of Hillsborough Holdings, Formerly Jim Walter Corp., Was the End of an Era
for an Investment Giant Of The '80s, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1990, at Dl; Linda Sandler, Sollth
land's Junk Bonds Face Trouble, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1989, at C3; Linda Sandler, "Predators
Ball" Belles Will Be Buy-Out Bonds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1989, at C3.
90. See Stark et al., supra note 84, at 566-81 (describing development of event risk cove
nants).
91. See Bratton, supra note 50, at 156; Gram!, supra note 84, at 34-35; Stark et al., supra
note 844, at 509; Peter D.W. Heiberling, Event Risk Provisions Protect Bondholders Against
Takeovers, 22 NAT'L LJ., June 5, 1989, at 22; Daniel Hertzberg, Poison Piii Bonds Are Lat·
est Weapon in Companies' Anti-Takeover Strategy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at AS; Larry
Light, Investors Are Developing a Taste for This Poison, Bus. WK., July 10, 1989, at 78.
92. See Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 42 at 211-12; Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover
Provisions in Bonds, supra note 50, at 937-38; Kahan & Klausner, The Qualified Case
Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, supra note 50; Macey, supra note 7, at 36; Andrew J.
Nussbaum, Like Money in The Bank? An Economic Analysis of Fiduciary Duties to Protect
the S&L Deposit Insurance Fund, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 355, 365-66 (1992); Schwarcz, supra
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The important thing to notice about this disagreement between
bondholder advocates and proponents of shareholder value maximiza
tion is its intractability. They disagree essentially over what prefer
ences should be ascribed to bondholders. The mere ascription of
preferences, however, is a notoriously weak foundation for economic
explanation. Consider first the claim of proponents of shareholder
value maximization. Their argument against any duty to bondholders
rests on the claiJn that bondholders and shareholders would agree ex
ante to terms that put the risk of loss from financial innovation on
bondholders, because shareholders would demand a price higher for
protection from such loss than bondholders would be willing to pay.
This argument amounts to no more than an assertion about what
prices, as a result of underlying preferences, would be. We cannot,
however, know what relative preferences and therefore prices will be
between bondholders and shareholders respecting financial innovation
risk by looking at any deals shareholders and bondholders have actu
ally struck. In practice, bondholders cannot contract into fiduciary or
similar protection as a gap-filling rule that is superior to what share
holders get, whether or not they wanted to do so. Bondholders could
not get a contractual term that says, "for all matters not addressed in
this contract, the interests of bondholders are to be treated by corpo
rate directors as equal to (or superior to) those of common sharehold
ers." As interpreted by modern courts and academic commentators,
such a provision would violate managers' fiduciary duty to sharehold
ers.93 If bondholders and shareholders were so free, then their failure
to agree on such benefits for bondholders might be evidence that from
their perspective the costs of this protection would outweigh the bene
fits. But as long as the governing rule is that shareholders benefit ex
clusively from a fiduciary duty and bondholders can get only express
contractual protections, a contract term purporting to provide bond
holders with something like gap-filling fiduciary protection would be
unenforceable. Nothing consequently can be inferred from the pres
ent allocation of risks, not even underlying preferences.
Critics of shareholder value maximization, however, are in an
equally untenable position. Millon imagines, in effect, a hypothetical
bargain between bondholders and shareholders, resulting in a Pareto
optimality rule protecting bondholders; however, this result is based,
as much as the argument above is based, on ungrounded assumptions
about what bondholders would prefer. It simply assumes bondholders
would value this protection by more than shareholders would charge
for it. Millon on one side, and Easterbrook and Fischel on the other,
are arguing over what is inside a black box.
Yet the exercise is useful because it makes one realize that once

note 84, at 681; Stark et al., supra note 84, at 579.
93. See supra notes 3, 19, and 23.
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one has imaginatively put bondholders and shareholders across the ta
ble to negotiate gap-filling rules, there is no determinate outcome, be
it Pareto-optimality, or shareholder wealth maximization, or anything
else (unless one begs the question by asserting that the parties' prefer
ences will lead to one's preferred result). Framed as a hypothetical
contract between shareholders and bondholders, the problem of set
tling on a gap-filling rule is intractable. This is a clue that the problem
is incorrectly formulated. As I have argued in this Article, however,
there is a way out. That way is to take the gap-filling rule as the result
not of a hypothetical bargain among shareholders and bondholders
(and other layers of the corporate capital structure), but as the result
of a hypothetical bargain among the rational investors in the firm.
They would settle on the maximization of firm value as the filler of
gaps in the corporate contract. Cast this way, the problem is anything
but intractable.
We can apply this gap-filling principle to cases in which
bondholders have invoked a purported fiduciary duty owed to them.
In Metropolitan and other cases,94 the courts ruled that bondholders
could not recover losses they suffered as a result of leveraged
transactions that did not violate express contract terms. This result
would be consistent with the rule rational investors would select as a
gap-filling rule, but only if the transaction in question increased the
value of stock by more than it decreased the value of the bonds.
There is some evidence that LBOs by and large did have this firm
value-increasing effect.95
Rationally diversified investors would
approve transactions that increased firm value and would be
indifferent toward distributional issues, for example the losses to
bondholders. This principle would, of course, only be a gap-filling
rule.
If firms would be worth more with stronger or weaker
bondholder protections than those implicit in this gap-filling rule, they

94. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. E-II Holdings, Inc., 926 F.2d 636, 64344 (7th Cir. 1991); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons
v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988); Pittelman v. Pearce, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359 (Ct. App.
1992); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); Hazzard v. Chase Nat'! Bank,
287 N.Y.S. 541, 566-67 Sup. Ct. (1936), affd mem., 14 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1939), affd
mem., 26 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1940).
95. See Paul Asquith & Thierry A. Wizman, Event Risk, Covenants, and Bondholder
Returns in Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN ECON. 195 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating
Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance ofSubstitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 818-19 (1987);
Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private
Transactions, 44 J. FIN 771 (1989); Laurentius Marais et al., Wealth Effects of Going Private
for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN ECON. 155 (1989); Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg,
Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV.
207 (1988); Krishna G. Palepu, Consequences of Leveraged Buyollts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 247
.
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should be able to provide for that by contract. Absent such express
provisions, however, if an LBO were to decrease total firm value by
reducing the value of bonds by more than it increased the value of
stock, a court applying the fiduciary duty principle I propose should
rule that the transaction breached a fiduciary duty that the managers
owed not to bondholders, but to the target corporation.96
Cases such as Metropolitan would thus probably come out the
same way under the neotraditional version of the fiduciary duty I pro
pose as they did under the analysis courts actually employed. This
convergence may constitute some weak support for my view, in the
sense that it is consistent with these judicial results. LBO cases might
also be taken as support for the general view that courts applying fidu
ciary duty analysis to public corporations accord little weight to purely
distributional concerns in filling gaps in the public corporate contract.
This emphasis on maximizing firm value is consistent with the neotra
ditional approach.
B.

Targeted Share Repurchases and Auctions

-

Unocal and Revlon

In targeted share repurchases ("TSRs"), corporations buy back
stock from some shareholders but not others. TSRs typically involve
the purchase of a large block of shares from a potential acquirer of the
company at a significant premium over their markef value and their
purchase price.97 Though stigmatized as "greenmail," evidence sug
gests that TSRs may actually increase, on average, the total value of
companies that engage in them.98 Yet TSRs probably also distribute
gains disproportionately from some shareholders to others.
TSRs typically involve shares of public corporations. They repre
sent a relatively clear instance in which shareholders are not treated
with horizontal equality but in which the transaction in question in-

96. See Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 685-86.
97. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV.
1377 (1986); Michael Bradley & L. Macdonald Wakeman, The Wealth Effects of
Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. FIN ECON. 301, 306-07 (1983); Larry Y. Dann, Common
Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders, 9 J. FIN
ECON. 113 (1981); Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Ne
gotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN ECON. 275, 28588 (1983).
L. REV.

.

.

.

<

98. See Bradley & Wakeman, supra note 97, at 312-13; William J. Carney, Controlling
Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 398; Dann & DeAngelo, supra note 97, at 295; Clifford G. Holder
ness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors,
14 J. FIN. ECON. 555 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 208-09 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S.
McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985); Wayne
H. Mikkelson & Richard S. Ruback, Targeted Share Repurchases and Common Stock Re
turns, 22 RAND J. ECON. 544 (1991); A. Schliefer & R.W. Vishny, Greenmail, White Knights,
and Shareholders Interest, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293 (1986).
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creases the total value of all financial claims on the company. Pennis
sive treatment of TSRs by courts is consistent with the idea that the
corporate law norm mandates maximization of firm value but is rela
tively indifferent to distributional consequences even within a single
class of claimants, unless distributions violate express corporate con
tractual terms.
TSRs are restricted, however, when there is substantial reason to
doubt that their use will maximize firm value. Unocal involved a TSR
formulated to protect against a tender offer hostile to the firm's in
cumbent management.99 The Delaware court imposed the restrictions
of what became known as the Unocal standard.100 This standard is
sometimes construed as pennitting TSRs calculated to increase firm
value, by fending off low bids, for example, but not those merely in
tended to entrench management.
The landmark Revlon case,101 often cited as support for
shareholder primacy, deserves special attention. It made explicit a
fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the winning bid in the context
of a firm sale.102 In Revlon, management's attempted friendly deal
with the white knight Forstmann-Little stopped the auction of the firm
in exchange for the white knight's supporting the price of notes whose
poison-pill-like covenants had to be removed for the friendly deal to
go forward. The white knight's promise to support note prices was
apparently calculated to reduce the exposure of target directors to
personal liability from suits by disaffected note holders.103 Revlon
could be taken to stand for the proposition that a bidder could do
nothing to accommodate vulnerable note holders or other claimants, if
it meant shareholders would get one penny less.104
This is, however, exactly the sort of shareholder primacy an effi
cient corporate law norm should eschew. Under my theory, Revlon
management should have been allowed to accept, after a firm-value
maximizing auction, a bid that offered the most in total value for the
firm, even if it offered less than another bid for stock. Would one
really want courts to compel Revlon management to accept, with the
company on the auction block, a lower bid, just because it offered

99. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
100. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Life and Adventures of
Unocal - Part I: Moore the Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85 (1998); Janet E. Kerr, Delaware

Goes Shopping for a "New" Interpretation of the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the QVC
Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 616-20 (1995).

101. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
102. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
103. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
104. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (chastising Revlon management for accepting buyout
terms that benefited subordinated note holders at the expense of shareholders).
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more per share than another bid that offered to buy both Revlon stock
and notes, and offered more in total for securities of the company? To
insist on such a result would make a fetish of shareholder value maxi
mization. The neotraditional approach I propose is entirely consistent
with a rational version of the Revlon duty that would require manag
ers, when auctioning off the company, to sell it to the highest bidder.
My approach merely insists that the size of the bid be measured by the
sum of amounts offered for all of the target's securities, not merely its
common stock. In any event, it seems unlikely that the sum Forstman
Little actually offered for Revlon notes, even if taken into account,
would have made its bid the highest. If, however, it would have, then
Revlon management would have acted consistently with their fiduci
ary duty, in my view, in selling Revlon to Forstman-Little. Indeed,
one can imagine that in a case like Revlon, a white knight and incum
bent management might want to budget part of the total expense of
acquiring control of the target firm toward relief of noteholders or
other financial claimants who would otherwise suffer losses from the
transaction and therefore oppose it. It would be arbitrary to refuse to
count these payments as part of the value the bidder was offering to
pay for the target firm.
C.

Recapitalizations Affecting Preferred Stock

Although not residual claimants, preferred stockholders are equity
claimants on their firm and, traditionally, beneficiaries of a fiduciary
duty.105 Yet a series of celebrated corporate law cases shows the noto
rious indifference of corporate law toward managerial decisions that
allocate corporate value away from preferred stockholders and toward
.common stockholders.106 In these recapitalizations, accumulated pre
ferred dividends were extinguished and replaced with newly issued
common or preferred stock. As a first approximation, this sort of re-

105. See Great W. Producers Co-op. v. Great W. United Corp., 613 P.2d 873, 875 (Colo.
1980); Kirschner Bros. Oil v. Natomas Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 784, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 569 P.2d 875, 881 (Colo. Ct. App.
1977); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986); Susan A. Barrett,

Fiduciary Duties and Stock Warrants: A Fine Distinction Between Shareholder Rights and
Contract Rights, 21 STETSON L. REV. 253, 260 (1991); Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty,
supra note 45, at 651; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (and
Why We Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443, 454 (1996); Robert B. Robbins & Barton
Clark, The Board's Fiduciary Duty to Preferred Stockholders, 7 INSIGHTS, No. 11, at 18, 21-

22 (1993).
106. See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), affd, 146
F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969); Western
Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d
341 (Mich. 1949); Iowa ex rel Weede v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948); Johnson v.
Fuller, 121 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1941); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.
1944), affd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944); Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar Co., 19 A.2d 820
(N.J. Ch. 1940); HB Korenvaes lnvs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 748 (1993)
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 15 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1938).

256

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:214

capitalization should have, under the Miller-Modigliani irrelevance
theorem, only distributional consequences and leave the total value of
the firm unaffected.107
Courts addressed these cases with contract-style analysis. They
read the corporate contract as containing an implicit term that the
chartering authority, the state legislature, could change the rules by
passing merger statutes that allowed the sort of recapitalization statute
in question to proceed.108 Another slightly narrower and perhaps
preferable interpretation of these cases would be to take courts as
filling gaps in corporate contracts. The contracts were silent on the
rights and duties of various classes of equity claimants in the face of
legal innovation. The courts might be seen as applying a hypothetical
contract term that rational investors proportionally invested in com
mon and preferred stock would prefer, namely that transactions that
might increase the value of the firm, even while distributing gains from
one equity class to another, be permitted, unless specifically prohib
ited by other terms in the corporate contract. If this is the correct gap
filling principle, the courts' seemingly cold treatment of preferred
stockholders is unobjectionable. The decisions are consistent with a
default rule to which rational investors would agree ex ante.
D.

Close Corporations

As D. Gordon Smith recently argued, the history of the share
holder primacy doctrine bears out the idea that it historically dealt
mainly with horizontal equity among shareholders in the context of
the close, not public, corporation.109 The famous Dodge v . Ford Motor
Co. 110 case, often cited as a landmark statement of the shareholder
primacy norm,111 far from "enunciating a meta-principle of corporate
law," as Smith points out, "was merely deciding a dispute between
majority and minority shareholders in a closely held corporation in the
2
same way courts had decided such disputes for nearly a century. "11
As Smith explains, the shareholder primacy norm grew out of the
older idea that the corporation was a trust for those interested in it,
namely shareholders. Controlling shareholders had a fiduciary duty to

107. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
F!NANCE 376 (4th ed. 1991).
108. See Bove, 249 A.2d at 97-98 (stating that "the stockholder's contractual rights have
been altered, but in each instance the alterations are permitted by the stockholder's contract
into which the law reads the reserved power to amend or repeal. That power is a part of the
charter or articles of association of every Rhode Island corporation").
109. See Smith, supra note 3, at 322-23.
110. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
111. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1423-24.
112. Smith, supra note 3, at 320.
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all shareholders. This idea matured into the modem doctrine of mi
nority oppression. The idea behind the doctrine lingered on in
phrases in the case law, such as the oft-quoted language of Ford and of
Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co. : " [T]he ultimate object of every ordinary
trading corporation is the pecuniary gain of its stockholders."113
For purposes of the neotraditional formulation of the corporate
norm, however, corporations with publicly traded securities and
closely held corporations should be clearly distinguished. This is be
cause the logic of the neotraditional formulation is driven by the
choices of rational investors in the capital markets. While there is a
strong warrant for treating diversified investors as complying with the
full mandate of CAPM, treating part owners of close corporations,
who are more akin to partners in an enterprise, in the same way would
not be justifiable. This does not mean that analysts would not profit
from taking a contractual approach to understanding the law of close
corporations, as some scholars have done.114 It merely means that the
conclusions that follow from the diversification of rational CAPM in
vestors do not apply directly to the close corporation context.

IV. THE CORPORATE LAW NORM AND "DERIVATIVE REALITY"
I have argued that the corporate law norm of "maximizing
shareholder value" is inefficient. I began with the problem of Credit
Lyonnais and used the omnipresence of the "vicinity of insolvency"115
to suggest the depth of the problem. The neotraditional corporate law
norm, I argue, is the way out of this conundrum: rational investors
would choose in a hypothetical bargain to maximize firm, not
shareholder, value.
One might argue that the difference between the shareholder value
maximization and the neotraditional formulation of fiduciary duty is
not that important. In most garden-variety firms, one might say, both
norms would point managers in the right direction, and the practical
problem will always be pushing managers the right way. Arguing
about whether the fiduciary duty should require maximizing firm
value, instead of shareholder value, one might say, is arguing about
the details of a utopia no one will ever actually see. This criticism,
however, would be shortsighted, as I argue below.
Shifting to the neotraditional norm would make a significant dif
ference to corporate law practice and judicial opinions but, under cur
rent conditions, not a radical one. I suggested above two immediate
implications of my proposal. First, under the neotraditional formula113. 53 N.W. 218, 223 (Mich. 1892); see also Smith, supra note 3, at 314 (relating Miner
to the nineteenth century shift to protection of minority shareholders).
114. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 228-52.
115. See supra Section I.A.2.
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tion of the fiduciary duty, the Revlon duty would have to change: tar
get managers should be able to accept a friendly bid, if that bid totaled
more than another bid that offered more for the target's common
stock.116 Second, transactions that reduced the total value of the firm,
even though they increased the value of the target's common stock, as
a leveraged buyout could conceivably do, should be seen as violating
managers' fiduciary duty to the corporation, unless the transaction was
expressly permitted by the "corporate contract" - in the corporate
articles or bond indentures, for example. Leveraged transactions that
are inefficient in this way, I grant, would probably be extreme and un
usual.117
The most important difference that a shift would make, however,
stems from the tendency of economic evolution to subject our legal in
frastructure to stress, turning relatively harmless doctrinal incoheren
cies into embarrassing errors. In the next few decades, it seems likely,
as Professor Hu has argued, that financial innovation, in particular the
development of various equity derivatives, will test current concep
tions of fiduciary duty.118 It is already obvious that the shareholder
value maximization norm will not be up to these tests. As capital
markets grow more complete, the problems with the shareholder
value maximization norm will be difficult to limit to merely academic
discussions.
A.

Disaggregating Equity

1.

Residual Claims

Financial products can be quite complicated,119 but for our pur
poses the theoretical problems raised by equity derivatives can be de
scribed simply and schematically. Modem financial theory explains
that options are the building blocks of all financial instruments and
provides precise models of how options are priced.120 "Financial engi-

116. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
117. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
118. See sources cited supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
119. For general discussions of different derivatives, see Hu, supra note 15; Karol, supra
note 17; Kleinbard, supra note 16; Joseph L. Motes III, A Primer on the Trade and Regula
tion of Derivative Instruments, 49 SMU L. REV. 579 (1996); Barbara Donnelly Granito,
Common Terms in the Derivatives Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at A6; Cathy E.
Minehan & Katerina Simons, Managing Risk in the '90s: What Should You Be Asking About
Derivatives?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Sept. 19, 1995, at 3; Balvinder S. Sangha, Financial
Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues, Bus. ECON., Jan. 1. 1995, at 46.
120. Options are the building blocks of more complex derivatives. See Frank Partnoy,
Financial Derivatives and the Costs ofRegulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 216 (1997);
Kenneth A. Froot et al., A Framework for Risk Management, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1994, at 91, 99; Donald L. Horwitz, Derivatives, I: The Basics on Tenns and Risks, 5 Bus. L.
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neers," who design new security products, can therefore disaggregate
common stock into its component financial parts, including options.
Equity can be disaggregated in different ways, but for our purposes we
can imagine this process as being analogous to the slicing of a cake;
but unlike the usual practice of cutting perpendicularly to the bottom
of the cake, imagine slicing along a horizontal plane, parallel to the
bottom of the cake. Slicing common stock horizontally, in this picture,
divides it into different call-option-like claims that have different exer
cise prices. I call this "horizontal" because these divisions are like the
horizontal divisions between different layers of financing on the right
side of the corporate balance sheet. These layers of conventional fi
nancing are, after all, like call options that have increasingly high exer
cise prices as one moves down the right side of the balance sheet
(through horizontal layers) from senior debt to common stock. Thus
the senior-most debt has an exercise price of zero. The first dollars of
the firm's value must go to those who hold the senior-most claims.
These claims are capped at the total amount due on the senior debt,
and this line marks the beginning, or exercise price, of the next layer
of firm financing. This layer in turn has a cap equal to the exercise
price of the next layer, and so forth, until one reaches the junior-most
claims on the firm.
In a conventional capital structure, the bottommost layer would be
common stock of the familiar sort. These are the residual claimants in
whom the standard view of corporate law would vest control rights
and the exclusive right to benefit from the fiduciary duty, because of
their supposed incentives to maximize the value of the firm. What ad
vances in financial technology make it possible to do, among other
things, is to slice the distribution of risks and returns depicted on the
conventional corporate balance sheet into thinner layers. To take one
example, some investment bankers once proposed that firms sell "un
bundled stock units."121 The proposed transaction would have divided
up common stock into several components, including a security repre
senting the expectation that firms would continue to pay dividends at
historical rates, and also a call-option-like security representing a
claim to appreciation of the firm's value above its current value. Of
course, one would not have to stop there. One could disaggregate

TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 38; Sangha, supra note 119, at 46.

121. For the story of unbundled stock units, see, for example, Alan J. Berkeley & Jean
E. Minarick, Disclosure and Developments in Financing Instruments and Techniques, 703
PLl/CORP 335, 349 (1990); John D. Finnerty & Victor M. Borun, An Analysis of Unbundled
Stock Units, 1 GLOBAL FIN. J. 47-69 (1989); Hu, supra note 15, at 1299; Raymond W. Wag
ner, Unbundled Stock Units, 662 PLl/CORP 175 {1989); Report, Sixth Annual Review of De
velopments in Business Financing, 45 Bus. LAW. 441, 446-49 (1989) (describing unbundled
stock units); George Anders & Steve Swartz, Some Big Firms to Break up Stock into New
Securities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1988, at Cl; Floyd Norris, Shearson's Financial Alchemy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1988, at Fl; and William E. Sheeline, Unbundled Stocks: How They
Work, FORTUNE, Jan. 2, 1989, at 11.
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common stock into any number of call-option-like claims, each class of
which would give the holder a claim to the value of the firm at in
creasingly larger amounts above its current value. These "horizontal"
call option slices of the value of firm, being further and further "out of
the money," would represent increasingly "residual" and increasingly
22
leveraged claims on the value of the firm.1
Using new financial products to disaggregate equity horizontally
does not achieve anything fundamentally different from what finan
ciers could do with more familiar tools. Simply by borrowing more
money, for example, managers could make the firm more highly lev
eraged, and this would, in effect, increase the exercise price of the call
options we quaintly call the common stock. For lawyers thinking
about fiduciary duty, what the new instruments can do, however, is to
force one to confront doctrinal difficulties. Thus, for example, if man
agers borrow for the first time, so that the firm goes from an all-equity
capital structure to one in which debt equals equity, under the conven
tional view this makes no difference to either the object or content of
the fiduciary duty. Managers still owe common shareholders a duty to
maximize the value of their shares. Yet if the firm sells financially
equivalent call options (as firms increasingly do123), they owe pre
sumably no such duty to the holders of those options, who are in a fi
nancially equivalent position to holders of common stock in a lever
aged firm. As firms begin to offer more and different slices of what
would traditionally have been included in the common equity of a
firm's capital structure, what can the standard view tell us about the
object and content of the corporate fiduciary duty? Very little, I
think, that is satisfying.
One could begin with the principle Easterbrook and Fischel sug
gest, that common shareholders benefit from the fiduciary duty be
cause they are the residual claimants, and infer that those with the
most residual claims should be the exclusive beneficiaries of the duty.
This principle, however, is clearly unsatisfactory. Suppose a firm slices
up its equity into very thin slices, including call-option-like claims that
are very far out-of-the-money.124 Surely we do not want to place man-

122. See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41
413, 420-21 (1986).

Bus.

LAW.

123. See, e.g., Interneuron Pharmaceuticals Announces Call Option Arrangements, Bus.
WIRE, May 5, 1997; New Deals - IDEC Pharmaceutical Corp., B IOVENTURE VIEW, Oct. 1,
1997; A Twist for Issuers and Buyers, the Detachable Call Option Debuts in $67 Million Las
Vegas Deal, B OND B UYER, Apr. 9, 1992, at 5 (call options used in municipal finance).
124. An option is "out-of-the-money" when its exercise price is greater than the current
market value of the underlying security, such as stock. Thus an option to buy stock in
Amazon.com at a price of $175 would be out-of-the-money if Amazon.com were currently
trading at $150. Options that are out-of-the-money at their expiration or maturity date are
worthless. No one would pay anything for the right to buy for $175 a stock selling on the
market for only $150. The more the price of the underlying security is below the exercise
price of the option, the more the option is out-of-the-money.
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agers under a duty to maximize the value of those claims, irrespective
of the effects those actions would have on the value of other slices of
the value of the firm. The incentives of holders of far-out-of-the
money call options are equivalent to those of shareholders of very
highly leveraged firms. They would both have managers choose risky
but inefficient projects that would increase the value of their options,
even if they would decrease the total value of the firm. It may seem
reasonable to say that a highly leveraged firm has entered the "vicinity
of insolvency," but this mysterious region becomes more magical still
if we suppose the firm enters it as well by dividing up its equity into its
financial component parts. It is hard to see how the solvency of the
firm has changed by restructuring its equity, yet the troubling effect on
the incentives of its most residual claimants is exactly the same as if
the firm had leveraged itself to the hilt.
Alternative arguments for the standard view are difficult to for
mulate. If the most residual slices of equity are not those whose value
should be maximized, then what should be maximized? In fact, there
is no justification in finance theory for maximizing the value of any
one horizontal slice of the value of the firm. If one does not include
the interests of the most residual claim holders, for instance, in the
calculus of fiduciary duty, managers will not have the correct incen
tives to pursue projects that are quite risky but nevertheless efficient.
If one includes only the residual slice, the incentives are the opposite,
but potentially just as inefficient.
The only "slice" of the value of the firm the maximization of which
it would be efficient for managers to pursue as a matter of duty is a
vertical slice, one that includes a proportional amount of every layer of
the firm's capital structure. And this, as it happens, is precisely the
slice that CAPM mandates - for completely independent reasons,
that the rational investor should hold. This important convergence of
efficient portfolio theory and the modeling of efficient corporate gov
ernance and corporate norms has been unjustifiably neglected in con
temporary discussions of corporate law, and obscured by the empha
sis, dating back to Berle and Mean's profoundly premodern125 theories
of finance, on the "shareholders." No version of the standard account,
but only the neotraditional account of corporate fiduciary duty, yields
efficient managerial incentives.

Applying the options analysis to corporate capital structure, stock of a corporation is
like a call option in the sense that stockholders can be imagined as having the option to buy
the firm by paying off creditors and keeping any residual for themselves. If a company were
so highly leveraged that if it were to liquidate, not all creditors could be paid off in full, and
stockholders would get nothing, the "options" represented by common stock could be said
to be out-of-the-money.
125. See BERLE & PEDERSON, supra note 56.
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Letter Stock Puzzles

Another type of new equity product illustrates yet another
conundrum-producing quality of the shareholder value maximization
norm. It is now fairly common for large firms such as General Motors
to issue equity claims not on the value of the whole corporation but on
some part of the firm's business. GM pioneered the use of this "letter
stock" - so called because the first of its kind, General Motors E
stock, was tied to GM's Electronic Data Systems (EDS) division,
which it purchased from H. Ross Perot. As Hu explains, by 1991 GM
had three kinds of common stock:
ordinary common, Class E
common stock, and Class H common stock.126 Thus GM has multiple
classes of common stock, one of which is a residual claim on the firm
as a whole, the others being tied to the economic performance of
divisions of the firm. The influential investment newsletter Value
Line, in fact, treats GM as consisting of different firms, with the letter
stock being the common stock of the firms-within-the-firm.127
Under the shareholder value maximization norm, managers should
maximize the value of which of these classes of stock? There is no
reason to believe they can simultaneously maximize the value of each
of them. Furthermore, picking one class of stock as the "true" com
mon stock to be maximized would be merely arbitrary. Even if there
were some reason for doing so in the case of GM, it is easy to imagine
a case in which a firm had different classes of common stock tied to
different divisions of the company and whose unlettered common
stock represented only a trivial part of the firm's capitalization. When
the bottom layer of the traditional capital structure is cut into pieces in
this way, the shareholder value maximization norm tells managers
nothing about what share values they should maximize.
B.

Resolving Equity Puzzles

Option-like equity derivatives and letter stock are just two of the
new products that Hu rightly suggests present difficult, and I would
argue impossible, puzzles for traditional conceptions of fiduciary duty.
Hu's paradoxes, however, are less difficult than they might seem, if
one is willing to espouse the "neotraditional" reformulation of fiduci
ary duty that I propose.

1.

Maximization Rights

Hu correctly notes the impossibility of nonarbitrarily enforcing
multiple "maximization rights" to several classes of equity holders, all
126. See supra note 15.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
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of whose claims cannot be maximized simultaneously. This problem is
intractable as a matter of financial theory, since if equity shares are of
different priority in their claims to firm value, their value will respond
differently to the riskiness of the firm's underlying business. None of
these classes of claimants will have efficient incentives across all mag
nitudes of risk. Similarly, particular business decisions are bound to
affect the value of the different lines of business of the firm differently.
Shareholder value maximization provides no guidance to firms with
letter stock if it cannot specify which shares the norm targets. Indeed,
it is intuitively obvious that as financial innovation carves up the risk
and-return stream that firms produce into ever more specialized
pieces, a norm that calls for the maximization of the value of any one
sort of piece at the expense of others will diverge increasingly from ef
ficiency. The source of this problem should be faced squarely: the in
sistence that the object of the duty be concrete holders of financial
claims, rather than the abstract entity against which those claims are
held.
In the neotraditional approach I propose, the default norm for
managers would be to maximize the value of the firm. Thus in a firm
that had any number of horizontal slices of equity, the duty of manag
ers would be to maximize the sum of the value of the various securities
issued by the firm. If a firm had letter stock, managers would be duty
bound to make the decisions that maximized the value of the firm.
They would be violating the norm if they took decisions that increased
the value of one class of letter stock by less than it decreased the value
of another. Actual investors might well want to contract around these
duties. An efficient corporate law would allow them to do so. But the
efficient default rule to which hypothetical rational investors would
agree is to maximize firm value.
The neotraditional norm is very simple, yet it reduces the other
wise daunting conundrums of equity derivatives to almost trivial pro
portions. The more perverse the incentives of far-out-of-the-money
option holders were in a firm with thinly sliced equity, the less weight
they would have under the neotraditional norm. The misguided no
tion that most residual claimants are specially situated to promote op
timal managerial decisionmaking is simply abandoned, as it should be.
Managers of firms with letter stock would equally know what to do.
Common stock value would not be favored because it is more residual,
nor would managers be forced to make Solomonic choices among
claimants with equal and inconsistent claims. The managers would
just try to maximize the value of the firm. If claimants wanted more
than that, they would have to negotiate for it ex ante.

2.

Enforcing the Neotraditional Norm

Because the content of the neotraditional norm is the maximiza-
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tion of firm value, all securities holders could be beneficiaries of it si
multaneously. One might want to conceive of the rights that share
holders, and perhaps others, would have under the neotraditional ap
proach as being derivative in nature - that is, as belonging first to the
corporate entity and second, and only indirectly, to the shareholders
or other security holders. Because the right would be to have manag
ers maximize firm value, at the level of the default rule, the rights of
particular classes of security holders could not come into conflict. The
maximization of firm value might have distributional consequences
that particular classes of security holders might not like in particular
cases, but this would be matter that they should resolve ex ante by ne
gotiating provisions in the corporate contract. For example, bond
holders could negotiate, as they sometimes do now, for covenants that
protect them against the risk of leveraged transactions that decrease
the value of bonds even if they increase the total value of the firm.128
Throughout this Article, I have deliberately spoken in terms of a
corporate law "norm." A norm is not necessarily a rule that one can
enforce in court. Its authority more usually would take the form of a
persuasive guide that only occasionally acquires legal force. Thus, the
ability of shareholders to force firm managers to maximize share
holder value is quite limited - the sale of the firm as in Revlon pres
ents the clearest case. The business judgment rule permits much ra
tionalization of managerial self-seeking.129 Nevertheless, the idea that
it is for the shareholders that the managers ultimately manage firms,
and that what they are trying to do for the shareholders is maximize
the value of their shares, permeates both American corporate culture
and the influential economically oriented academic discussions of cor
porate law and policy. While shifting to a norm that makes more eco
nomic sense might not make a sudden and predictable practical differ
ence, it would still have a beneficial influence over time, especially in
an era of rapid financial change.
Implementing a new conception of fiduciary duty, especially one at
variance with much corporate law doctrine, would present many prac
tical problems that are beyond the scope of this Article, the purpose of
which is merely to begin discussion. It is worth noting, however, that
the neotraditional conception offers, at an idealized level, another ap-

128. See Richard G. Oemens, Poison Debt: The New Takeover Defense, 42 Bus. LAW.
747, 750 {1987); Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 42, at 197-200; Kahan & Klausner, Anti
takeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 50; Stark et al., supra note 84, at 566-68; Credit
policy: Event Risk Covenant Rankings, STANDARD & POOR'S CREomVEEK, July 24, 1989,
at 17; Daniel Hertzberg, "Poison-Put" Bonds Are Latest Weapon in Companies' Anti·
Takeover Strategy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at AS.
129. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Carol Seidler,
Comment, Assessing the Wisdom of the Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Control Con
tests: Is It Time to Make
. Shareholders' Interests Paramount?, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 919
{1990).
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pealing feature, and one that helps motivate an entity-based approach.
To explain this, let us return to the CAPM rational investor. If it were
the case that all investors in truth held the market portfolio, then in a
sense it would matter less what the content of the corporate law norm
was. If the norm were to "maximize the value of residual claims," the
CAPM rational investor would not press to enforce this norm, since
doing so would not maximize the value of his diversified portfolio. So
one might suppose that such a norm, though not finely tuned, would
do little harm. It would seem better, however, if we could formulate a
model that actually worked, at least at an idealized level, to push man
agers toward the efficient managerial decision, if it were perfectly en
forced.
To that end, consider the following idealized enforcement sce
nario. Imagine that security holders could costlessly monitor manage
rial decisions, and that some enforcement agency, such as a court,
could accurately determine when managerial decisions had departed
from the norm. What norm, and enforced by whom, would have the
effect of always correcting managerial departures from efficient deci
sionmaking? The unique answer to this question is the neotraditional
norm I propose, enforced by holders of all classes of securities. This
norm works because its enforcement mechanism would produce an
equilibrium at the efficient managerial decision. For example, imagine
that managers decide to undertake a risky, but inefficient, project that
will increase the value of residual claims but decrease the total value
of the firm If residual claimants are the only ones who can invoke the
norm and enforce it, managers will proceed with their inefficient plan.
But if nonresidual claimants could invoke and enforce the norm, they
would prevent the inefficient project. But could these nonresidual
claimants also prevent managers from undertaking some very risky
but efficient project that decreased the value of their nonresidual
claims but increased the value of residual claims by more? They could
not, if the norm were not the maximization of the value of their par
ticular claims, but the maximization of the sum of the value of all
claims, that is, the maximization of firm value. This is why efficiency
demands that the object of the duty be the corporation: no particular
class of claims can efficiently have a maximization right, but all classes
of claimants can have the right to demand that the value of the firm be
maximized. It is easy to see that, if this were the case, whenever man
agers undertook an inefficient project, some class of claimants would
have the incentive to challenge it. Managers could defend actions that
reduced the value of a class of claims only by showing that other
classes gained more than the challenging class lost. Thus only actions
that increased firm value would be immune from challenge from all
classes of claimants. Maximization of firm value would thus be the
equilibrium of the enforcement mechanism. If we then relax the as
sumption that all investors are CAPM rational investors, this equilib.
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rium survives. Investors specializing in residual or nonresidual claims
would have incentives to challenge inefficient projects, but invocation
of the norm would not allow them to push managers to make ineffi
cient decisions.
C.

Capital Market Imperfections

Hu stresses the difficulties capital market imperfections, informa
tion asymmetry, and the timing of firm cash flows can cause for con
ceptions of fiduciary duty.130 These problems, however, do not seem
any more insuperable for the neotraditional conception of fiduciary
duty than for the traditional one.
Financial research, it is true, has uncovered numerous apparent
imperfections in capital markets.131 Whether markets are perfect or
not, however, the relevant question is whether a better alternative for
valuation of the firm exists. Under Hu's "blissful shareholder wealth
maximization" duty, managers would be obliged to maximize the true
value of shares, blissfully ignoring inaccurate valuation by the stock
market. This approach implies a greater distrust in market valuation
than in managers' ability to value future cash flows themselves and to
rein in their natural human tendencies to self-service and optimism. If
shares can be valued blissfully, however, so can firms. Market imper
fections create no worse problems for valuing all of firm's financial
claims than they do for merely valuing its stock.
Of particular concern to Hu is the timing of cash flows. If markets
cannot perfectly anticipate the timing of cash flows, and managers
have information about the timing of flows superior to the market,
then they will face decisions that in effect force them to choose among
"generations" of shareholders. One investment might yield immediate
benefits, while another might pay off only years hence - a payoff
that, if we assume imperfect markets, might not reflect in the current
price. If managers choose the investment with the later payoff, future
shareholders will gain at the expense of present shareholders.132 Tim
ing creates a conflict of fiduciary duty similar to that of having multi
ple stock classes with conflicting maximization rights.
Yet if we assume that managers really do have information better
than the market's, the efficient result must be for managers to make
the investment that the market has undervalued. In due course, the
market will see its mistake, and share prices will rise to incorporate
better information about the project's cash flow. The problem, it may

130. See Hu, supra note 15; supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
131. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE:
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE, ch. 12 (1992).
132. See Hu, supra note 15, at 1300-05.
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seem, is that this correction will come too late for earlier generations
of shareholders, who will have already sold by this time.
This problem, however, like Hu's other paradoxes, may be unrav
eled with the help of hypothetical bargain theory using rational inves
tors. Rational investors are widely diversified. If they are diversified
across all firms, it seems likely they will be holding securities of firms
whose projects are at all stages of their life cycles. They will own some
stock in firms investing in projects that will not be correctly valued
currently and some stock in firms whose stock is rising only now to
correct previously mistaken valuations. Thus, rationally diversified
investors should not choose a rule that would have firms do anything
other than choose the value maximizing project, even if it did post
pone the realization of gains. Diversified shareholders should expect
to garner as many windfalls as they lose out on realizations of projects.
If the fiduciary rule required intergenerational shareholder equity,
however, this would reduce the total value of their portfolios. Their
holdings in companies with early maturing but factually less valuable
projects would not increase in value enough to make up for their
losses in firms with late-maturing but, by hypothesis, more valuable
projects. This leads to an interesting result. Rational investors in a
hypothetical bargain setting would not choose a fiduciary rule that re
quired some sort of equity across time. Rather, they would elect a rule
that required managers to maximize firm value, even if this value were
reflected in the price of securities only in the long run. (This only as
sumes, as seems plausible, that in the large sample of firms in the mar
ket portfolio, the maturity of projects would be normally distributed.)
Once again, rational investors choose an efficient fiduciary rule, and
paradoxes are avoided.
D.

Time and the Corporate Entity

Finally, Hu argues that if directors owe a fiduciary duty to "the
corporation," they may be obligated to avoid undertaking risky proj
ects that might lead to the demise of the corporation, even if diversi
fied shareholders would prefer that managers take these risks.133 This
criticism, however, attacks only a straw man. A duty to the corpora
tion could take several forms, and even a naively formulated duty
would not necessarily require a duty to maximize the duration of a
corporation's "life." In any event, the neotraditional formulation
would require, as a gap filler, that the sum of the values of financial
claims on the corporation be maximized. Managers conforming to this
duty would adopt risky projects to the extent that their adoption
would maximize the value of the firm, which might or might not be

133. See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment,
38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 295-306 (1990).
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consistent with maximizing the duration of the corporation's "life." In
fact, critics of a duty running to the corporation should notice the
beam in their own eye. It is not possible to formulate an efficient ver
sion of corporate fiduciary duty in terms of only one class of financial
claimants; it is necessary to invoke some proxy for the sum of the val
ues of claims against the corporation, such as the concept of the corpo
rate entity, to formulate an ideally efficient corporate fiduciary duty.
The best argument that could be made for a duty running exclusively
to shareholders would be that it is the best practical approximation of
an ideally efficient duty, such as that proposed by the neotraditional
formulation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The efficient norm for corporate law is simply: Maximize the value
of the corporation, that is, the sum of the values of all the claims the
corporation has issued on its value. This is just a default rule, around
which one would expect much contracting, especially as contracting
costs diminish over time. But it is the rule to which rationally diversi
fied investors would agree ex ante, and a rule that can survive the dis
aggregation of traditional equity that seems likely as financial markets
continue to evolve. Until that time, to say the primary corporate norm
is to "maximize shareholder value" perhaps will do, as long as we are
sure not to mean exactly what we say.
To shareholder value maximization, this Article offers an alterna
tive - a duty to the corporation to maximize firm value. Firm value
maximization is the efficient default rule. Hypothetical investors,
modeled according to the most highly developed relevant theory of ra
tional choice, would choose it. The proposed rule avoids problems
that are theoretically clear now and will become increasingly pressing
in practice.
More compelling as a theoretical matter is the convergence of ra
tional portfolio theory and a theory of an efficient version of the cor
porate law norm. For reasons independent of corporate law norms,
rational investors will hold a certain portfolio. This portfolio also
gives these investors the correct incentives to maximize the value of
the firm. The default rule chosen by investors of this sort will be the
efficient default rule for filling gaps in the corporate contract. This
bridge between the neotraditional corporate law norm and efficient
portfolio theory strongly recommends my approach.

